On Point: a. New factor defined

State v. Jonathan L. Liebzeit, 2021AP9-CR, District 3, 8/30/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1997, a circuit judge sentenced Liebzeit to life without the possibility of parole for a homicide he committed at the age of 19. In 2019, after hearing a presentation at a judicial education seminar about juvenile brain development and shortly thereafter sentencing an 18-year-old for a crime, the judge decided to to contact Liebzeit’s lawyer to suggest a sentence modification may be appropriate based on the new factor of the brain development research. After defense counsel filed a sentence modification motion the court modified Liebzeit’s sentence to make him eligible for paroled after 25 years based on two new factors: 1) new scientific understanding of brain maturity in adolescents; and 2) Liebzeit’s brain damage from his inhalant use. (¶¶4-22). The court of appeals holds the circuit court erred because Liebzeit didn’t prove either new factor.

State v. Michael Lee Muehl, 2021AP1755-CR & 2021AP1758-CR, District 4, 3/31/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court sentenced Muehl to prison and made him eligible for the earned release programs. Turns out Muehl was ineligible for those programs, so he filed a motion to modify his sentence on the grounds that his ineligibility was a “new factor”—that is, a fact highly relevant to the imposition of sentence that was not known to the judge at the time of sentencing because it wasn’t in existence or was unknowingly overlooked. State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. (¶¶2-10). Although a defendant’s ineligibility for earned release programming   might be a new factor in some cases, it isn’t here because Muehl hasn’t established his ineligibility was “highly relevant” to the sentencing decision.

State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement.

State v. Dustin M. Yanda, 2018AP412-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a “new factor” sentence modification doesn’t need to prove that the new factor “frustrates the purpose” of the original sentence. However, Harbor doesn’t preclude the sentencing court from considering whether the purpose of the sentence is frustrated in deciding whether to modify a sentence once the court has concluded the defendant has proven a new factor.

State v. Dimitri C. Boone, 2016AP918-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Boone sought a “new factor” sentence modification based on alleged inaccuracies in the report of the presentence investigation (PSI). The court of appeals holds that Boone failed to show the information in the PSI was inaccurate, failed to show new information, or failed to show any of the information was highly relevant to the circuit court’s sentencing decision.

State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2016AP866-CR, 6/16/17, granting a petition for review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. When a defendant is eligible for expungement under § 973.015 but expungement is not addressed the sentencing hearing, can the defendant raise the issue in a postconviction motion? If so, is a “new factor” motion the appropriate vehicle for bringing such a claim?

2. Did the circuit court err in its exercise of discretion when it denied Arberry expungement based on reasons that could apply in any case?