On Point: c. New factor not found

State v. Tracy Laver Hailes, 2021AP1339-CR, 5/9/23, District 1, (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals holds that under §973.01(2)(c) a circuit court may apply either §939.62(1) (governing habitual criminality) or §961.48 (governing second or subsequent offenses) to enhance a penalty, but it may not apply both. While the circuit court erroneously applied both enhancers in this case, the court of appeals nevertheless denied Hailes’s claims for plea withdrawal, sentence modification, and resentencing.

State v. Amber C. Debree, 2022AP1311-CR, 02/08/23, District II (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Debree’s disorderly conduct conviction stemmed from a physical altercation she had with her husband immediately after Debree learned he had impregnated her adult daughter. The sentencing court placed Debree on probation for two years after it questioned whether Debree was “truly accepting responsibility for her actions” and expressed concern about her criminal record. In response to the concerns about her criminal record, Debree moved the court to modify her sentence based on her history of being abused by her husband, which provided additional context to her actions in this case and some explanation for her criminal record. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirms the circuit court’s denial of her new factor claim because Debree could not show that her claimed new factor was “unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.” (Opinion, ¶8).

State v. Jonathan L. Liebzeit, 2021AP9-CR, District 3, 8/30/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1997, a circuit judge sentenced Liebzeit to life without the possibility of parole for a homicide he committed at the age of 19. In 2019, after hearing a presentation at a judicial education seminar about juvenile brain development and shortly thereafter sentencing an 18-year-old for a crime, the judge decided to to contact Liebzeit’s lawyer to suggest a sentence modification may be appropriate based on the new factor of the brain development research. After defense counsel filed a sentence modification motion the court modified Liebzeit’s sentence to make him eligible for paroled after 25 years based on two new factors: 1) new scientific understanding of brain maturity in adolescents; and 2) Liebzeit’s brain damage from his inhalant use. (¶¶4-22). The court of appeals holds the circuit court erred because Liebzeit didn’t prove either new factor.

State v. Jimmie L. Blount, 2021AP1943-CR, District 2, 6/8/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At one sentencing hearing on two different cases, the circuit court imposed on one case a 4-year bifurcated prison sentence—2 years’ confinement and 2 years’ extended supervision—and on the other ordered 3 years of probation. The court said the probation would be concurrent to the ES on the first case, which would’ve added another year onto the “global” disposition of 5 years. Both lawyers pointed out the probation has to be either concurrent with or consecutive to the total bifurcated sentence, so the judge ordered the probation to be consecutive, thus increasing the “global” disposition to 7 years. The judge’s need to correct its initial error didn’t amount to a new factor justifying sentence modification.

State v. Rebecca Sue Ferraro, 2021AP1654-CR, District 2, 6/8/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ferraro pled to and was sentenced for OWI, third offense, before the blood alcohol test result of her blood draw was available. At sentencing the preliminary breath test result was bandied about as one of the aggravating factors. A few days after sentencing, the BAC result arrived. Turns out it was lower than the PBT. That is not a new sentencing factor because it’s not highly relevant to the sentence imposed; and even if it was, the circuit court properly concluded it didn’t merit sentence modification.

State v. Michael Lee Muehl, 2021AP1755-CR & 2021AP1758-CR, District 4, 3/31/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court sentenced Muehl to prison and made him eligible for the earned release programs. Turns out Muehl was ineligible for those programs, so he filed a motion to modify his sentence on the grounds that his ineligibility was a “new factor”—that is, a fact highly relevant to the imposition of sentence that was not known to the judge at the time of sentencing because it wasn’t in existence or was unknowingly overlooked. State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. (¶¶2-10). Although a defendant’s ineligibility for earned release programming   might be a new factor in some cases, it isn’t here because Muehl hasn’t established his ineligibility was “highly relevant” to the sentencing decision.

State v. Dallas R. Christel, 2020AP1127-1128-Cr, 12/8/21, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Christel argued that §940.235, which criminalizes strangulation and suffocation, (1) violates substantive due process on its face and as applied to him, (2) is overbroad, and (3) is void for vagueness. He also argued for a new-factor-based sentence modification on his bail-jumping convictions. The court of appeals torpedoed every claim.

State v. James A. Carroll, Jr., 2021AP375, 8/26/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Carroll was charged with second-degree sexual assault; he ultimately took a deal and pleaded to fourth-degree. The circuit court required him to register as a sex offender for 15 years after the end of his supervision. The court of appeals rejects Carroll’s claims that his counsel’s deficiencies led to the plea, and that new factors justified modifying his sentence to remove the registration requirement.

State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement.

State v. Peter J. King, 2020 WI App 66;  case activity (including briefs)

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S Ct. 1730 (2017) struck down a law making it a felony for a registered sex offender to use any social networking site that permits minors to become members or to create personal web page. The statute was so broad that it violated the 1st Amendment. See our post here. In this case, the court of appeals holds that Packingham’s reasoning does not apply to court-ordered conditions of extended supervision that sharply restrict a defendant’s access to the internet.