On Point: H. Modification/Review

State v. Bradley Wayne Phillips, 2014AP2519-CR, District 1, 9/1/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Phillips challenges his conviction for failing to pay child support because:  (1) the trial court prohibited testimony from an expert witness about whether Phillips was employable; (2) the postconviction court did not find Phillips’s defense counsel ineffective for allegedly failing to present a plea offer from the State; (3) the postconviction court denied Phillips a Machner hearing on his multiple other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) the postconviction court denied Phillips’ motion for resentencing.  The court of appeals rejects all of Phillips’s claims. 

State v. Steven Ray Gaddis, 2015AP130-CR, District 1, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Even the sentencing judge admitted his sentencing explanation “could have been more extensive” (¶10). But, hey, it was good enough for government work.

State v. Greenwood, 2014AP2219-CR,6 /30/15, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Greenwood, who was convicted of several misdemeanors, sought resentencing on the grounds that the circuit court had relied on inaccurate information at the initial sentencing. Specifically, Greenwood alleged that the court believed his sentences would be served in  jail when, in fact, § 973.03(2) required that he serve his sentences in prison. The court  of appeals rejected this claim.

Glossip v. Gross, USSC No. 14-7955, 2015 WL 2473454 (June 29, 2015), affirming Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court rejects the claims of Oklahoma death-row prisoners that the use of a particular drug (midazolam) in the three-drug lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment because it creates an unacceptable risk of severe pain. In addition to deep disagreements about the applicable Eighth Amendment standard and the lower court’s fact-finding, the case is notable for the sparring between two concurring justices (Scalia and Thomas) and a dissenting justice (Breyer, joined by Ginsburg), who now believes “it highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment” and that the Court should ask for full briefing on that basic question. (Breyer dissent at 1, 2).

Questions Presented:

1) Did the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), adopt a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people sentenced as juveniles to life in prison without parole?

2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller?

State v. Travis Deon Williams, 2014AP2064-CR, 2014AP2065-CR, 2014AP2066-CR, and 2014AP2067-CR, District 1, 2/10/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The prosecutor presented inaccurate information at Williams’s sentencing, but Williams hasn’t proven the circuit court relied on the information.

State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2015 WI 6, 1/27/15), reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

Alexander claimed he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence was based in part on compelled statements he made to his supervision agent. The supreme court rejects his claim after concluding that the circuit court did not rely on the compelled statements in imposing sentence.

State v. Jose O. Gonzalez-Villarreal, 2013AP1615-CR, District 1, 1/27/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects Gonzalez-Villarreal’s challenge to his conviction for possessing child pornography based on claims that: his right to a speedy trial was violated; discovery restrictions violated his right to equal protection; other acts evidence was erroneously admitted; the trial court rejected his modified jury instruction on possession; the court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion.

State v. Charles A. McIntyre, 2014AP800-CR, District 3, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

When pronouncing sentence in McIntyre’s case the circuit court repeatedly interchanged “consecutive” and “concurrent” when referring to Count One (of five). (¶¶2-5). Thus, despite the court’s several attempts at clarification during the sentencing hearing, the sentence imposed on that count was ambiguous because it was “undeniably confusing and capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two different ways.” (¶11). Nonetheless, the court’s intent was clear, so it properly amended the judgment post-sentencing to clarify that Count One was consecutive.

State v. Timothy D. Russell, 2014AP451-CR, District 1, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

When sentencing Russell for a series of thefts committed while he was deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive, the circuit court referred to the charge to which Russell pled as “misconduct in public office, … not a theft as I think has been reported.” (¶8). The court of appeals holds that the sentencing transcript, when read as a whole, makes it clear that the circuit court did not erroneously believe it was sentencing Russell for the offense of misconduct in public office, but merely intended to note that Russell committed the offense of theft by virtue of his public position as deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive.