On Point blog, page 15 of 37

Sentencing court didn’t err in its interpretation or application of COMPAS report

State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.

Read full article >

George Toca v. Louisiana, USSC No. 14-6381, cert. granted 12/12/14

Questions presented:

1) Does the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), apply retroactively to this case?

2) Is a federal question raised by a claim that a state collateral review court erroneously failed to find that a new constitutional rule fits within an exception to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which held that new constitutional rules are generally not applied retroactively to cases on collateral review?

Read full article >

State v. Chamblis, 2012AP2782-CR, petition for review granted 11/18/14

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.

1.  Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?

2.  Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?

Read full article >

Court of appeals “sympathizes” with angst of dedicated criminal defense lawyers?!

State v. David M. Carlson, 2014 WI App 124; case activity

Note to trial courts: When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based what trial counsel said to his client, hold an evidentiary hearingNote to defense counsel: Data showing the sentences received by defendants charged with the same crimes as your client is about as useful as data showing a patient diagnosed with a lethal illness the survival rates of similarly-diagnosed patients.  Note to all: A single, inaccurate, hyperbolic remark during the course of a long sentencing explanation is harmless even if the trial court relied upon it.

Read full article >

Sentencing court didn’t improperly rely on defendant’s immigration status

State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2013AP646-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 11/4/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 58; case activity

The sentencing court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion by relying in part on Gayton’s immigration status or by failing to explain its reasons for imposing the maximum term of initial confinement and the DNA surcharge.

Read full article >

Records that support claims defense counsel made at sentencing not enough to merit resentencing or sentence modification

State v. Anthony Herman Williams, 2014AP447-CR & 2014AP448-CR, District 1, 9/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity: 2014AP447-CR; 2014AP448-CR

Cell phone records that corroborate a claim Williams’s trial lawyer made at sentencing regarding contact between Williams and the victims don’t show that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information because the records do little to corroborate the contact or support Williams’s version of events.

Read full article >

Lengthy imposed and stayed sentence wasn’t unduly harsh or excessive

State v. Britton D. McKenzie, 2014AP314-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Consecutive jail sentences totaling 24 months were not unduly harsh and excessive.

Read full article >

Was the pronouncement of sentence ambiguous? Or was the sentence illegal?

State v. Craig C. Meier, 2013AP2863-CR, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The answer matters: If the pronouncement of sentence is ambiguous the court could “clarify[] and “reimpose[]” the sentences it originally intended, Krueger v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 435, 442-43, 272 N.W.2d 847 (1979); if the sentence is illegal, it must be commuted to the lawful maximum, § 973.13. In this case the court of appeals holds the circuit court’s initial pronouncement of sentences in this case was ambiguous, so it affirms the circuit court’s “correction” of the sentences to reflect the sentences the court intended to impose.

Read full article >

Failure to present evidence of alternative sources for child’s sexual knowledge wasn’t ineffective

State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

Read full article >

State v. Danny Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, petition for review granted 6/12/14

On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the inclusion in the PSI of statements Alexander made to his probation agent, and the trial court’s consideration of the statements at sentencing, violate Alexander’s right against self-incrimination?

Read full article >