On Point blog, page 16 of 37
SCOTUS: Using bright-line cutoff IQ score to determine intellectual disability violates Eighth Amendment
Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, May 27, 2014, reversing Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Because “intellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and an IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning, the Supreme Court invalidates Florida’s bright-line rule that a defendant is not intellectually disabled—and thus may be executed—if he has never scored below 70 on an IQ test.
Stalking statute was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant; letters on which stalking convictions were based constituted a “true threat”
State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.
Sentencing court’s “assumption” that defendant acted with intent to kill victim was not inaccurate information
State v. Jameil A. Garrett, 2013AP1178-CR & 2013AP1179-CR, District 2, 4/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity: 2013AP1178-CR; 2013AP1179-CR
The circuit court did not sentence Garrett based on an “unwarranted assumption” that Garrett acted with intent to kill the victim of a strangulation offense. Thus, Garrett is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
Restitution award upheld despite evidence of inflated repair estimates
State v. Paul J. Williquette, 2013AP2127-CR, District 4, 4/17/14; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
What happens when a restitution award is twice the victim’s actual repair costs? In this case, not much. Williquette was ordered to pay restitution based upon State-submitted repair estimates. Later, he moved for sentence modification claiming the actual (and lesser) amount the victim paid for repairs was a “new factor” justifying a reduced restitution award. The COA held that by not challenging the estimates at sentencing, Williquette stipulated to their reasonableness and that the actual repair costs did not amount to a “new factor.”
Correct information about sentence credit constitutes a “new factor”
State v. Dennis R. Armstrong, 2014 WI App 59; case activity
The fact that Armstrong was entitled to eight months rather than approximately two years of sentence credit is a “new factor” because the information was unknowingly overlooked at sentencing and the amount of sentence credit was highly relevant to the circuit court’s imposition of the sentence:
¶13 At the sentencing hearing,
Petition for Review to Watch: State v. Mark S. Rigdon, 2013AP200-CR
Issues Presented:
1. Has the court of appeals effectively overturned this court’s precedent recognizing undue harshness as a ground for sentence modification?
2. Is the time ripe for this court to put teeth in the McCleary-Gallion mandate that the appellate courts ensure that sentences – particularly sentences in the highest range – are rational and explainable?
Court of Appeals opinion: State v. Mark S. Rigdon,
Trial court’s failure to explain reasons for sentence saved by postconviction remarks
State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.
Resentencing required because PSI included defendant’s compelled statements to probation agent
State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed, 2015 WI 6; case activity
Alexander was on probation when he was charged with forgery. He pled to the forgery and a PSI was prepared. (¶2). Attached to the PSI were statements the defendant made to his probation agent about two other forgeries.
Resentencing judge was not vindictive, did not rely on inaccurate information, and did not impose excessive sentence
State v. Quincy Lashawn Baker, 2013AP242-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Baker was given a resentencing hearing based on inaccurate information about the maximum periods of confinement and supervision for the crime of conviction (felony murder). (¶¶4-5). At the resentencing hearing before a different judge, the state argued Baker’s profane outburst at the conclusion of his original sentencing hearing showed a lack of remorse.
Defendant must file a separate § 973.195 sentence adjustment petition for each sentence to be adjusted
State v. Jeffery Polar, Jr., 2014 WI App 15; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the plain language of § 973.195(1r)(a) requires a defendant serving multiple sentences to file a separate sentence adjustment petition for each individual sentence the defendant is seeking to adjust.
Polar’s governing sentences consisted of two consecutive terms, one with 7 years of confinement, the second for 3 years of confinement.