On Point: H. Modification/Review

State v. B.M., 2021AP501-FT, 12/14/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A court found “Brandon” delinquent and placed him on juvenile supervision. It said that if the State wanted electronic monitoring it could “schedule further proceedings and we’ll take that up.” But then the written order directed that he “shall participate in the electronic monitoring program as deemed appropriate by the assigned juvenile worker for any violation of supervision.”

State v. Thomas M. Parkman, 2021AP27, 9/16/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In February 2020, a few weeks before the COVID-19 pandemic really got going in Wisconsin, the circuit court sentenced Parkman to six months in jail for three misdemeanors stemming from an incident in which he attacked his ex-girlfriend with pepper spray. He was given an April report date, but the circuit court sua sponte delayed that date in recognition of the dangers posed to jail inmates by COVID. It has been delayed ever since. This is an appeal of the circuit court’s denial of Parkman’s motion to modify his sentence to probation with an imposed-and-stayed jail sentence: that is, he was asking the court to permanently stay the jail (so long as his probation was not revoked).

State v. James A. Carroll, Jr., 2021AP375, 8/26/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Carroll was charged with second-degree sexual assault; he ultimately took a deal and pleaded to fourth-degree. The circuit court required him to register as a sex offender for 15 years after the end of his supervision. The court of appeals rejects Carroll’s claims that his counsel’s deficiencies led to the plea, and that new factors justified modifying his sentence to remove the registration requirement.

State v. Christopher W. LeBlanc, 2020AP62-CR, District 2, 7/30/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

If a sentencing court imposes an excessive term of initial confinement (IC) or extended supervision (ES) when sentencing a defendant under Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS), the defendant “is entitled to a new sentencing hearing as a matter of law unless the nonexcessive term of IC or ES is at the maximum, in which case the court has the discretion to commute the excessive component to the maximum term pursuant to Wis. Stat. §973.13 (2019-20) without holding a new sentencing hearing.” (¶1).

State v. Lisa Rena Lantz, 2020AP742-CR, District 3, 7/27/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lantz was convicted of conspiring to deliver methamphetamine between September 2015 and March 2016 and of soliciting the delivery of methamphetamine in February and March 2016. The court of appeals rejects Lantz’s argument that the charges are multiplicitous. It also rejects her challenge to her sentences.

State v. Alexandrea C.E. Throndson, 2020AP1081-CR, District 4, 7/15/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Throndson raises two due process challenges to her sentencing: that the judge relied on inaccurate information and was objectively based. The court of appeals rejects both.

State v. Westley D. Whitaker, 2020AP29-CR, petition for review of a published decision of the court of appeals granted 6/16/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issues Presented (from the PFR and supreme court order granting review)

1. Does it violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution to consider a defendant’s religious identity and impose a sentence intended to deter crime solely within his religious community?
2. If a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s religious association to deter other members of a religious community, does the “reliable nexus” test of State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994), and State v. J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d 655, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991), require congruity between the offense and the activity protected by the First Amendment?
3. Does the sentencing factor/objective of “protection of the public” permit the sentencing court to increase the sentence imposed on the defendant to send a message to an identified set of third parties that they should alter their behavior in the future, apart from generally being deterred from committing offenses like those committed by the defendant? (Added by the supreme court.)

State v. Scott William Forrett, 2021 WI App 31, petition for review granted, 9/14/21, affirmed, 2022 WI 37; case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin permits a driver’s prior refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test as a criminal penalty enhancer for a subsequent OWI. In an open and shut opinion that is recommended for publication, the court of appeals just declared that statutory scheme unconstitutional based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), and State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.

State v. C.G., 2018AP2205, review granted 4/27/21; case activity

Issues presented:

Does Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the statute governing juvenile sex offender registration, unconstitutionally infringe on Ella’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech by preventing her from legally changing her name to reflect her gender identity?

Does requiring Ella to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

Jones v. Mississippi, USSC No. 18-1259, 2021 WL 1566605, April 22, 2021; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

“In a case involving [sentencing] an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide [to life without parole], a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” (Slip op. at 5) (emphasis added).