On Point blog, page 5 of 37
SCOW again can’t decide the law; declares truth unknowable; two votes missing
State v. Donavinn D. Coffee, 2020 WI 1, 1/9/20, 2017AP2292, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Where to begin?
More on using algorithms to predict risk in criminal cases
You’ve read a lot about the use of algorithms at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings, but they are also used at the bail and parole stages. This new paper looks at the bias embedded in algorithms (including the STATIC-99R) and zeroes in on our own State v. Loomis.
“Order lifetime supervision” is enough said, given totality of sentencing remarks
State v. Shawn A. Anderson, 2019AP173-CR, District 3, 11/13/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court’s sentencing remarks considered in their entirety showed the court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Anderson to be subject to lifetime supervision under § 939.615.
Defense win! Trial court relied on inaccurate information at sentencing
State v. Vaylan G. Morris, 2018AP1694-CR, Distrct 1, 10/1/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
O.M., an infant, died while c0-sleeping with Morris and her mom. Morris admitted that he may have rolled over onto her and pled guilty to 2nd degree recklessly endangering safety, party to a crime, At sentencing, the State said that O.M.’s cause of death could have been the synthetic marijuana that Morris had been smoking, even though the medical examiner attested that it wasn’t.
Challenges to use of CHIPS information at sentencing rejected
State v. Dominique M. Anwar, 2018AP2222-CR, 6/25/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects Anwar’s arguments that she’s entitled to resentencing because the State offered certain information at her sentencing hearing without first disclosing the information and giving her notice it would use the information.
In deciding whether to modify sentence based on a new factor, court may consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the sentence
State v. Dustin M. Yanda, 2018AP412-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a “new factor” sentence modification doesn’t need to prove that the new factor “frustrates the purpose” of the original sentence. However, Harbor doesn’t preclude the sentencing court from considering whether the purpose of the sentence is frustrated in deciding whether to modify a sentence once the court has concluded the defendant has proven a new factor.
SCOTUS takes on death penalty re-sentencing issues
McKinney v. Arizona, USSC No. 18-1109, certiorari granted 6/10/19; affirmed 2/25/20
1. Whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law when weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine whether a death sentence is warranted
2. Whether the correction of error under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), requires resentencing.
SCOTUS to decide whether defendant must challenge length of his sentence to preserve the issue for appeal
Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, USSC No. 18-7739, cert granted 5/30/19
Whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant’s sentence.
SCOW to decide if failing to object to consideration of information at sentencing forfeits right to review
State v. Carrie E. Counihan, 2017AP2265-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/19, and State v. Donavinn Coffee, 2017AP2292-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/19; case activity (Counihan; Coffee)
Issues:
Does a defendant forfeit his right to challenge a judge’s consideration of information at sentencing by failing to object to the information at the time of sentencing?
If trial counsel does not object to the court’s consideration of the information and the defendant alleges postconviction that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, what is the standard for determining whether trial counsel’s failure was prejudicial?
How to argue with the COMPAS Algorithm
Looks like NYU Professor Ann Washington has done the hard work for you. Her new article, How to Argue With an Algorithm: Lessons from the Compass-ProPublica Debate, strives to inform courtroom arguments over the integrity of algorithms used to predict risk during the sentencing process.