On Point: 7. Resentencing

State v. James J. Socha, 2021AP1083-CR & 2021AP2116-CR, District 1, 4/25/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs): 2021AP1083-CR; 2021AP2116-CR

The fact that some of Socha’s prior OWI offenses have been lawfully vacated since he was sentenced may constitute a new factor justifying sentence modification, so the circuit courts erred in denying Socha’s motions for sentence modification without a hearing.

State v. Singh, 2021AP1111-CR, 8/18/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Singh challenges his 2005 conviction for OWI, first offense. He first asks for a writ of coram nobis vacating the conviction. Alternatively, he asks that his conviction be vacated or amended under State v. Forrett, 2022 WI 37, 401 Wis. 2d 678, 974 N.W.2d 422, which held that an OWI penalty cannot be increased because of a prior revocation stemming from a refusal to submit a warrantless blood draw.

State v. Christopher W. LeBlanc, 2020AP62-CR, District 2, 7/30/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

If a sentencing court imposes an excessive term of initial confinement (IC) or extended supervision (ES) when sentencing a defendant under Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS), the defendant “is entitled to a new sentencing hearing as a matter of law unless the nonexcessive term of IC or ES is at the maximum, in which case the court has the discretion to commute the excessive component to the maximum term pursuant to Wis. Stat. §973.13 (2019-20) without holding a new sentencing hearing.” (¶1).

State v. Richard H. Harrison, Jr., 2020 WI 35, 4/17/20, reversing an unpublished decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Addressing an unusual issue that is now also effectively moot due to developments in the case since the cross petitions for review were granted, a majority of the supreme court holds that Harrison isn’t entitled to sentence credit or sentence “advancement” toward an earlier sentence for time spent in custody on a consecutive sentence that is later vacated.

McKinney v. Arizona, USSC No. 18-1109, certiorari granted 6/10/19; affirmed 2/25/20

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law when weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine whether a death sentence is warranted

2. Whether the correction of error under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), requires resentencing.

State v. Caleb J. Hawley, 2018AP1601-CR, District 4, 3/28/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The judge who sentenced Hawley after revocation of probation stayed the sentence and ordered it to start some 14 months down the road, when Hawley would finished serving the 18 months of conditional jail time ordered in a different case. That stay was illegal, and the remedy is resentencing—not, as Hawley argues, credit for the time he was in custody since the day of his sentencing after revocation.

State v. Pierre Deshawn Johnson, 2018AP595-CR, 2/12/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Johnson pled to operating a vehicle with a suspended license and injury by operating under the influence of a controlled substance. His lead issue–whether the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt was a significant intervening factor that diminished his culpability and warranted a new sentence–failed based on State v. Turk, 154 Wis. 2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163.

State v. Steven F. Zastrow, 2015AP2182-CRAC, District 3, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Zastrow was serving a string of four consecutive prison sentences, the first imposed in June 2006 in Winnebago County, the other three imposed in October 2006 in Outagamie County. In 2008 the Winnebago sentence was vacated and Zastrow was resentenced to imposed and stayed prison time and placed on probation consecutive to the Outagamie sentences. DOC thereafter recalculated the release dates on the remaining three Outagamie sentences, and decided those sentences started running in 2008, when the Winnebago sentence was vacated. (¶¶2-4). Wrong, says the court of appeals. Those sentences began back in October 2006, on the date they were imposed.

State v. Thomas G. St. Peter, 2016AP683-CR, District 1, 4/18/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

St. Peter is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the judge violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information to jump the parties’ joint recommendation for time served and impose more jail time. State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (sentencing based on inaccurate information violates due process). Not only that, but the judge erroneously exercised his sentencing discretion by failing to link the relevant facts and factors of the case to the standard sentencing objectives. —And you thought an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion was as mythical a beast as a unicorn!

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether a defendant may, by voluntary absence or other conduct, waive the statutory right to be present at trial before the trial has begun?