On Point blog, page 2 of 2
Statute creating both misdemeanor and felony offense isn’t subject to rule of lenity, doesn’t violate due process or equal protection
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, petitions for review and cross-review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed 2017 WI 74, ; case activity (including briefs)
Lazo Villamil was convicted and sentenced for operating after revocation and causing death under § 343.44, one of the provisions of which says that the offense is both a misdemeanor and a felony. He claims that convicting and sentencing him for the felony rather the misdemeanor violated the rule of lenity and his rights to due process and equal protection. The court of appeals disagrees, but grants resentencing due to the circuit court’s failure to consider certain sentencing factors..
SCOTUS: Ordinance allowing police inspection of hotel registry is facially unconstitutional
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, USSC No. 13-1175, 2015 WL 2473445 (June 22, 2015), affirming 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
A majority of the Supreme Court holds that a Los Angeles ordinance compelling hotel operators to make their guest registries available to police for inspection on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes the hoteliers for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity to obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply. Along the way, the Court clarifies that “facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored” (slip op. at 4), clarifying language from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), that some courts have read as barring facial challenges to statutes under the Fourth Amendment.
Charging under superseded statute was “technical error” that didn’t prejudice defendant
State v. Robert J. Tisland, 2012AP1570-CR, District 4, 1/22/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Even if two legislative acts made inconsistent changes to a criminal statute and meant the changes made by the earlier act were superseded by the later one, a charge filed under the provisions of the superseded act was not, under the circumstances of this case, a charge for a crime unknown to law that deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction or competency; instead, it was a technical charging error that didn’t prejudice the defendant.
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, USSC No. 13-1175, cert. granted 10/20/14
(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and
(2) Whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.
Implied consent law covering drivers not arrested for OWI is constitutional; defendant’s consent to blood draw was voluntary
State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity
The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.
County ordinance prohibiting squealing of tires not unconstitutionally vague, so traffic stop based on suspicion of violation of ordinance was reasonable
State v. Michael E. Mauermann, 2012AP2568-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Iowa County Ordinance § 600.08 provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as to make any loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise in or about any public street, alley, park or private residence which may tend to annoy or disturb another by causing the tires of said vehicle to squeal,
Indiana ban on sex offenders using social networking and social media sites violates First Amendment
Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana, Case No. 12-2512, 1/23/13; Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
A recent Indiana statute prohibits most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, and chat programs. John Doe, on behalf of a class of similarly situated sex offenders, challenges this law on First Amendment grounds. We reverse the district court and hold that the law as drafted is unconstitutional. Though content neutral,
Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-158, cert granted 1/18/13
1. Do the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations?
2. Can the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act,