On Point blog, page 1 of 2
SCOTUS: Penalty enhancement statute must be interpreted to apply narrowly
Dubin v. United States, USSC No. 22-10, 2023 WL 3872518 (June 8, 2023), vacating and remanding United States v. Dubin, 27 F.4th 1021 (5th Cir. 2022); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Faced with competing interpretations of a penalty enhancement statute, the Supreme Court adopts the narrower interpretation based on both a careful reading of the language and context of the statute and its “tradition[] of “exercis[ing] restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” (Slip op. 17).
SCOW clarifies scope of affirmative defense for victims of human and child sex trafficking
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2021 WI App 46, 7/6/22, case activity (including briefs)
There’s been a lot of press on this case, so we’ll skip the facts. Kizer is charged with 1st-degree intentional homicide and other felonies in connection with the death of a man she says trafficked her. She asserts §939.46(1), which provides “an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result” of human or child sex trafficking. In a split decision, SCOW decided two questions of statutory interpretation. Now the circuit court must apply the clarified statute and decide whether Kizer gets a jury instruction on this defense at trial.
COA: trial court did not err in imposing lower OWI sentence under statutory treatment provision
State v. Eric Jean Overvig, 2019AP1786, 9/8/21, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Overvig was arrested for OWI-3rd and promptly put himself into intensive alcohol treatment. When it came time for sentencing, the trial court imposed probation with 20 days of conditional jail time. Ordinarily, under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3., the minimum for OWI-3rd would be 45 days, but there’s an exception in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(cm) pertaining to certain probationers who undergo drug treatment: for them, the minimum is 15. The state appeals, arguing Overvig didn’t qualify for this exception, but the court of appeals holds that he did.
Court of appeals continues to constrict expunction statute
State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2020 WI App 59; case activity (including briefs); review granted 11/18/2020, affirmed, 2021 WI 60
This is not much of a surprise after State v. Ozuna, but the court of appeals here reverses a grant of expunction, holding in a to-be-published decision that any noncompliance with conditions of probation–even those that are not ordered by the court, but are imposed by DOC rule–makes expunction unavailable.
SCOTUS: Illegal gun possession requires defendant’s knowledge of fact that makes it illegal
Rehaif v. United States, USSC No. 17-9560, 2019 WL 2552487, June 21, 2019, reversing 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Federal law bans certain classes of people from possessing guns, and provides stiff penalties (up to ten years in prison if there are no enhancers) if they do. One of those classes consists of people who are aliens illegally in the country. Rehaif was illegally in the country and possessed firearms. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him only if he “knowingly” possessed a gun, but refused to instruct it that he also had to know he was illegally in the country. He was convicted, and the Court now holds this was error: the mens rea in the illegal gun possession statute applies both the the possession and to the status that makes the possession illegal.
SCOW finds no problem with felony and misdemeanor penalty for same OAR offense
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2017 WI 74, 7/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A few years ago the legislature set out to create a graduated penalty scheme for operating after revocation offenses, but it bungled the job and ended up creating misdemeanor and felony penalties for the offense of causing death while knowingly operating after revocation. The supreme court rebuffs Villamil’s claims that under the rule of lenity only the misdemeanor penalty can be imposed or, in the alternative, that creating two very different penalties for the same crime violates due process and equal protection. The court agrees with his request for resentencing, however, because the circuit court failed to consider the statutorily mandated sentencing factors.
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2015AP791-CR, petitions for review and cross-review granted 1/9/2017
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from the petition for review and petition for cross-review)
1. Whether the offense under § 343.44(2)(ar)4. can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony in order to resolve ambiguity in the statutory language when the legislature’s intent was to create a penalty scheme with increasing penalties for additional elements; or whether, instead, the doctrine of implied repeal should be employed to correct the obvious drafting error that created the ambiguity as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.
2. Whether § 343.44(2)(ar)4., having been interpreted to give discretion to the prosecution to charge an offense as a misdemeanor or a felony, can be constitutionally applied.
3. Whether the provision in § 343.44(2)(b) stating that the circuit court “shall” consider certain sentencing factors is mandatory or directory.
Statute creating both misdemeanor and felony offense isn’t subject to rule of lenity, doesn’t violate due process or equal protection
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, petitions for review and cross-review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed 2017 WI 74, ; case activity (including briefs)
Lazo Villamil was convicted and sentenced for operating after revocation and causing death under § 343.44, one of the provisions of which says that the offense is both a misdemeanor and a felony. He claims that convicting and sentencing him for the felony rather the misdemeanor violated the rule of lenity and his rights to due process and equal protection. The court of appeals disagrees, but grants resentencing due to the circuit court’s failure to consider certain sentencing factors..
Carburetor cleaner is an “intoxicant” under prior version of OWI statute
State v. John Steven Duewell, 2015AP43-44-CR, 3/23/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a decision that seems to conflict directly with State v. Torbeck, 2012 WI App 106, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 N.W.2d 414, see our post here, the court of appeals holds that carburetor cleaner is an intoxicant under Wisconsin’s OWI statute, Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a)(2011-2012).
SCOTUS gives Federal child pornography minimum sentence law broad reading
Lockhart v. United States, USSC No. 14-8358, 2016 WL 782862 (March 1, 2016); affirming United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography must be given a prison term of at least ten years if the defendant “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Federal courts had disagreed about whether a conviction for “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” had to “involv[e] a minor or ward,” or whether the “minor or ward” language applied only to convictions for “abusive sexual conduct.” The Supreme Court holds, 6 to 2, that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct.”