On Point blog, page 1 of 1
SCOTUS: Penalty enhancement statute must be interpreted to apply narrowly
Dubin v. United States, USSC No. 22-10, 2023 WL 3872518 (June 8, 2023), vacating and remanding United States v. Dubin, 27 F.4th 1021 (5th Cir. 2022); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Faced with competing interpretations of a penalty enhancement statute, the Supreme Court adopts the narrower interpretation based on both a careful reading of the language and context of the statute and its “tradition[] of “exercis[ing] restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” (Slip op. 17).
SCOTUS: Governor setting meetings, calls, events in exchange for gifts not illegal
McDonnell v. United States, USSC No. 15-474, 2016 WL 3461561 (June 27, 2016), reversing United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
While he was governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, along with his wife, accepted gifts and favors worth about $175,000 from a businessman who was trying to get the state medical schools to run studies on a nutritional supplement his company had developed. As discussed in our post on the cert grant, a jury convicted McDonnell of various honest services fraud and extortion counts in relation to various actions he undertook related to the supplement, including arranging and attending meetings with other government officials about the supplement and hosting a private lunch with the businessman at which checks were given to university researchers.
SCOTUS limits the “tangible objects” covered by 18 U.S.C. 1519’s evidence destruction prohibition
Yates v. United States, USSC No. 13-7451, 2015 WL 773330 (February 25, 2015); reversing 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page
In a four-one-four decision that is chock-a-block with nautical references and features some sparring about the canons and methods of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court holds that the “anti-shredding provision” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, applies only to records, documents, or similar types of “tangible objects” used to record or preserve information. Thus, Yates’s conviction—for destroying fish that were evidence of his alleged violation of federal fishing regulations—must be jettisoned: “A fish is no doubt an object that is tangible; fish can be seen, caught, and handled, and a catch, as this case illustrates, is vulnerable to destruction. But it would cut § 1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects, whatever their size or significance, destroyed with obstructive intent.” (Plurality at 2).