On Point blog, page 2 of 7
SCOTUS: Penalty enhancement statute must be interpreted to apply narrowly
Dubin v. United States, USSC No. 22-10, 2023 WL 3872518 (June 8, 2023), vacating and remanding United States v. Dubin, 27 F.4th 1021 (5th Cir. 2022); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Faced with competing interpretations of a penalty enhancement statute, the Supreme Court adopts the narrower interpretation based on both a careful reading of the language and context of the statute and its “tradition[] of “exercis[ing] restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” (Slip op. 17).
Essential reading: Dallet’s concurrence in the Marsy’s law case
Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2023 WI 38, 5/16/23, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
In a 6-1 opinion, SCOW held that the ballot question for Marsy’s law complied with Wis. Const. art. XII §1. That’s the old news. The new and BIG news is Justice Dallet’s concurrence. It is essential reading for lawyers arguing constitutional or statutory construction issues to SCOW. She, Karofsky, and A.W. Bradley say that they are not bound by “methodologies” for interpreting constitutions and statutes–specifically “originalism” or strict adherence to the “plain language”–that SCOW has used in some past cases. If Justice-elect Protasiewicz agrees, we may soon see some defense-friendly constructions of our constitution and statutes.
COA: license suspension for 25 over in a 55 applies where 55 is posted
State v. Tisha Lee Love, 2022AP1422, 12/30/22, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Love appeals a jury verdict rendered against her for driving 87 miles per hour in a 55 zone.
SCOW clarifies scope of affirmative defense for victims of human and child sex trafficking
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2021 WI App 46, 7/6/22, case activity (including briefs)
There’s been a lot of press on this case, so we’ll skip the facts. Kizer is charged with 1st-degree intentional homicide and other felonies in connection with the death of a man she says trafficked her. She asserts §939.46(1), which provides “an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result” of human or child sex trafficking. In a split decision, SCOW decided two questions of statutory interpretation. Now the circuit court must apply the clarified statute and decide whether Kizer gets a jury instruction on this defense at trial.
State v. Corey T. Rector, 2020AP1213, certification granted 2/16/22
On review of a court of appeals certification; affirmed 5/23/23; case activity (including briefs);
Issue:
Whether Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1, which mandates lifetime sex-offender registration where a person has been convicted of a sex offense “on 2 or more separate occasions,” applies when a person’s only eligible convictions are entered on multiple guilty pleas in the same case.
COA: trial court did not err in imposing lower OWI sentence under statutory treatment provision
State v. Eric Jean Overvig, 2019AP1786, 9/8/21, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Overvig was arrested for OWI-3rd and promptly put himself into intensive alcohol treatment. When it came time for sentencing, the trial court imposed probation with 20 days of conditional jail time. Ordinarily, under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3., the minimum for OWI-3rd would be 45 days, but there’s an exception in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(cm) pertaining to certain probationers who undergo drug treatment: for them, the minimum is 15. The state appeals, arguing Overvig didn’t qualify for this exception, but the court of appeals holds that he did.
SCOW clarifies law regarding substitution of judges in civil cases
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)
Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.
Court of appeals continues to constrict expunction statute
State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2020 WI App 59; case activity (including briefs); review granted 11/18/2020, affirmed, 2021 WI 60
This is not much of a surprise after State v. Ozuna, but the court of appeals here reverses a grant of expunction, holding in a to-be-published decision that any noncompliance with conditions of probation–even those that are not ordered by the court, but are imposed by DOC rule–makes expunction unavailable.
SCOTUS holds Constitution requires unanimous jury in state criminal trials
Ramos v. Louisiana, USSC No. 18-5924, 2020 WL 1906545, 4/20/20, reversing State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44 (La. Ct. Apps. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
The holding in this case has no relevance to Wisconsin practitioners, or indeed anyone outside of Louisiana or Oregon–the only two jurisdictions permitting 10-2 guilty verdicts in criminal trials. The Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in federal trials, and our state supreme court has long held the Wisconsin Constitution confers the same right. See Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979). So if you’re interested only in the impact on your practice, there is none, and you can stop reading now.
Sanction for violation of juvenile disposition order limited to 10 calendar days
State v. A.A., 2020 WI App 11; case activity
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.355(6)(d)1. sets a maximum length of “not more than 10 days” for a custody sanction that a circuit court may impose on a juvenile who has violated a dispositional order. Is that 10 calendar days? Or, as the state argues, does “day” mean 24 consecutive hours, so that the maximum sanction is 10 consecutive 24-hour periods? It’s a calendar day, essentially, holds the court of appeals.