On Point blog, page 3 of 7
COA holds, over dissent, that juvenile court’s waiver into adult court binds all future courts
State v. Matthew C. Hinkle, 2018 WI App 67, petition for review granted 4/9/19; affirmed 11/12/19; case activity (including briefs)
Hinkle, a 16-year-old boy, was charged as a juvenile in two different counties for a car theft and police chase. In Milwaukee County, the juvenile court waived him into adult court. So, did the Fond du Lac court have to treat him as an adult too?
Identity theft doesn’t require some extra act of “representing” in addition to “use” of identifying documents
State v. Christopher A. Mason, 2018 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)
Applying its newly minted decision in State v. Stewart, 2018 WI App 41, the court of appeals holds that the “representing” element of identity theft under § 943.201 can be proven with the same evidence that proves the defendant “used” the identifying information or documents.
The statutes authorize fines for 7th and greater OWI offenses
State v. Michel L. Wortman, 2017 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)
A glitch in the OWI penalty statute appears to suggest that OWI 7th and greater offenses don’t allow for a fine, but only for the imposition of the forfeiture provided for first-offense OWI. The court of appeals concludes otherwise. The court also rejects Wortman’s claim that he was under arrest when a sheriff’s deputy transported him back to the scene of the accident he was in.
SCOW finds no problem with felony and misdemeanor penalty for same OAR offense
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2017 WI 74, 7/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A few years ago the legislature set out to create a graduated penalty scheme for operating after revocation offenses, but it bungled the job and ended up creating misdemeanor and felony penalties for the offense of causing death while knowingly operating after revocation. The supreme court rebuffs Villamil’s claims that under the rule of lenity only the misdemeanor penalty can be imposed or, in the alternative, that creating two very different penalties for the same crime violates due process and equal protection. The court agrees with his request for resentencing, however, because the circuit court failed to consider the statutorily mandated sentencing factors.
SCOW: Expunction requires perfect conduct on probation, maybe?
State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?
SCOW to take up new ch. 980 discharge trial standard
State v. David Hager, 2015AP330, and State v. Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, petitions for review granted 5/15/17, reversed 4/19/18; review of published court of appeals decisions (Hager) (Carter); case activity (Hager) (Carter) (including briefs)
We’ve posted on these cases a few times. The first time was when the court of appeals certified them (together) to the supreme court. The supreme court refused that certification, so the court of appeals decided them (separately), as we discussed here and here.
Let the decision stand, sit, shake, stay, roll over
Today’s edition of SCOWstats studies the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s use of stare decisis and reveals what superb trainers our justices are!
SCOW: Madison can’t ban weapons on city buses; statutes don’t mean what they say
Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, 3/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2015WI App 74, case activity (including briefs)
Justice Kelly’s maiden majority opinion opens with a 4-page discussion of a subject both parties disavowed–the Second Amendment right to bear arms. According to the briefs, this case posed only an issue of statutory interpretation–essentially, whether §66.0409, which governs the “local regulation of weapons,” preempts a City of Madison Transit and Parking Commission rule that prohibits people from carrying weapons, including guns, on City buses.
By the end of the primer on the 2nd Amendment, you can predict the result: A 5-2 opinion reversing a unanimous court of appeals decision holding that §66.0409(2)’s plain language applies to a “political subsdivision’s” “ordinances” or “resolutions” not to a Transit Commission “rule” banning weapons. But you might not predict that the majority opinion would dial back the conservative “strict constructionist” approach to statutory interpretation adopted in State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County. Henceforth, a statute’s text should be no obstacle to the interpretation you desire.
SCOW: no 980 discharge trial for inconsequential behavioral changes
State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 3/9/17, affirming an unpublished summary court of appeals order; case activity (including briefs)
Thornon Talley, who is committed as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, filed a petition for discharge from that commitment in 2012. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The supreme court now unanimously upholds that denial, essentially because Talley did not show any meaningful change in his condition since his previous discharge trial (also in 2012).
SCOW overrules 12-year-old precedent, denies postconviction DNA testing
State v. Jeffrey C. Denny, 2017 WI 17, reversing a published court of appeals decision; 2015AP202-CR, 2/28/2017; case activity (including briefs)
In State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884, the supreme court unanimously held that Wis. Stat. § 974.07, the postconviction DNA testing statute, provides two routes for a convicted defendant seeking exoneration: a defendant satisfying certain basic criteria may pay for his own testing of physical evidence; one making a stronger showing of potential significance may secure such testing at public expense. The court now closes off the first, self-paid route.