On Point: 1. Principles of

St. Croix County Department of Health and Human Services v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2016 WI 35, 05/12/2016, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, finds itself roundly praised and deeply buried by our high court.

Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country.

State v. John Steven Duewell, 2015AP43-44-CR, 3/23/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that seems to conflict directly with State v. Torbeck, 2012 WI App 106, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 N.W.2d 414, see our post here, the court of appeals holds that carburetor cleaner is an intoxicant under Wisconsin’s OWI statute, Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a)(2011-2012).

Lockhart v. United States, USSC No. 14-8358, 2016 WL 782862  (March 1, 2016); affirming United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography must be given a prison term of at least ten years if the defendant “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Federal courts had disagreed about whether a conviction for “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” had to “involv[e] a minor or ward,” or whether the “minor or ward” language applied only to convictions for “abusive sexual conduct.” The Supreme Court holds, 6 to 2, that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct.”

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does the state statute preempting certain local firearm regulations, § 66.0409(2), apply to the Madison Transit and Parking Commission’s rule prohibiting weapons on city buses?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

In this case the supreme court will address an important issue about the offense of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, § 948.075(1r). The court of appeals granted McKellips a new trial on a charge under that statute, holding the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.” The supreme court might also address another issue that has implications beyond § 948.075: Namely, whether instructional error that isn’t objected to at trial can be a basis for a new trial in the interest of justice.

Wisconsin Carry, Inc. & Thomas Waltz v. City of Madison, 2015 WI App 74, petition for review granted 1/11/16, reversed 2017 WI 19; case activity (including briefs)

The state statute preempting certain local firearm regulations, § 66.0409(2), doesn’t apply to the rule prohibiting weapons on city buses adopted by the Madison Transit and Parking Commission. The plain language of the statute shows the legislature chose limited language that applies only to “ordinances” or “resolutions” enacted by a political subdivision, and the Commission’s rule isn’t an “ordinance” or “resolution” under well-established law, Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 288 N.W.2d 779 (1980).

State v. Albert J. Chagnon, 2015 WI App 66; case activity (including briefs)

Under § 948.14, no registered sex offender may intentionally “capture a representation” of a minor without consent of the minor’s parent or guardian. The phrase “captures a representation” is defined in § 942.09(1)(a) to mean “takes a photograph, makes a motion picture, videotape, or other visual representation, or records or stores in any medium data that represents a visual image.” The court of appeals concludes the phrase “captures a representation” cannot reasonably be construed to apply to Chagnon’s act of cutting pictures of minors from magazines and newspapers, pasting them into a notebook, and adorning the pictures with graphic sexual comments.

Question presented:

Whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), on the ground that the state offense is “described in” a specified federal statute, where the federal statute includes an interstate commerce element that the state offense lacks.

State v. Rory A. McKellips, 2015 WI App 31, petition for review granted 11/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 51; case activity (including briefs)

McKellips is entitled to a new trial on charges he used a computer to facilitate a child sex crime because the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system,” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.”