On Point: e. Plain text

State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 3/9/17, affirming an unpublished summary court of appeals order; case activity (including briefs)

Thornon Talley, who is committed as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, filed a petition for discharge from that commitment in 2012. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The supreme court now unanimously upholds that denial, essentially because Talley did not show any meaningful change in his condition since his previous discharge trial (also in 2012).

State v. David Hager, Jr., 2017 WI App 8, petition for review granted 5/15/17; reversed 4/19/18; case activity (including briefs)

This is the first (likely) published case to construe the 2013 amendments to the ch. 980 discharge petition standard. The court of appeals holds that while the legislature required a committed person seeking a discharge trial to meet a higher burden of production, it did not permit courts to deny a trial based on an assessment that the evidence as a whole favors the state.

Question presented:

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, that a naturalized American citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement.

State v. Judith Ann Detert-Moriarty, 2017 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)

The Wisconsin Equal Access to Justice Act, § 814.245, doesn’t apply to a person who prevailed in a forfeiture action brought in the name of the State of Wisconsin because the clear statutory language covers only actions brought by “a state agency.”

Voisine v. United States, USSC No. 14-10154, 2016 WL 3461559, 579 U.S. ___ (June 27, 2016), affirming United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). That phrase is defined to include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the “use … of physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Resolving a question that United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 n.8 (2014), left unanswered, the Court, by a 5-to-2 vote, holds that misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless conduct (as contrasted to knowing or intentional conduct) trigger the statutory firearms ban.

Luna Torres v. Lynch, USSC No. 14-1096, 2016 WL 2903424 (May 19, 2016), affirming Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The definition of “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), has 21 subsections covering dozens of different crimes. Many of the subsections refer to offenses “described in” particular federal statutes, all of which include the interstate commerce element necessary for federal criminal jurisdiction. A catch-all at the end of the statute says that “aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law….” This decision says that a state offense that lacks an interstate commerce element, but corresponds in all other ways to a listed federal offense, is an aggravated felony.

Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country.

State v. John Steven Duewell, 2015AP43-44-CR, 3/23/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that seems to conflict directly with State v. Torbeck, 2012 WI App 106, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 N.W.2d 414, see our post here, the court of appeals holds that carburetor cleaner is an intoxicant under Wisconsin’s OWI statute, Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a)(2011-2012).

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does the state statute preempting certain local firearm regulations, § 66.0409(2), apply to the Madison Transit and Parking Commission’s rule prohibiting weapons on city buses?

Wisconsin Carry, Inc. & Thomas Waltz v. City of Madison, 2015 WI App 74, petition for review granted 1/11/16, reversed 2017 WI 19; case activity (including briefs)

The state statute preempting certain local firearm regulations, § 66.0409(2), doesn’t apply to the rule prohibiting weapons on city buses adopted by the Madison Transit and Parking Commission. The plain language of the statute shows the legislature chose limited language that applies only to “ordinances” or “resolutions” enacted by a political subdivision, and the Commission’s rule isn’t an “ordinance” or “resolution” under well-established law, Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 288 N.W.2d 779 (1980).