On Point blog, page 1 of 2
In complex statutory construction case, COA clarifies authority of DNR wardens to conduct OWI investigation
State v. John R. Phelan, 2024AP777-CR, 8/14/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity
In a very complex analysis of the statutes which empower DNR wardens, COA holds that the warden in this case had authority to seize Phelan for suspected littering, validly detained him after obtaining probable cause that he possessed THC, but violated the law by conducting an investigation into an OWI.
In published decision, COA holds that corporation counsel is not a party under 48.13 when they are not a petitioner
S.G. v. Wisconsin DCF, 2024AP472, 4/3/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity
In a unique CHIPS appeal, COA clarifies the proper role of corporation counsel when another party files a CHIPS petition.
SCOTUS: Penalty enhancement statute must be interpreted to apply narrowly
Dubin v. United States, USSC No. 22-10, 2023 WL 3872518 (June 8, 2023), vacating and remanding United States v. Dubin, 27 F.4th 1021 (5th Cir. 2022); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Faced with competing interpretations of a penalty enhancement statute, the Supreme Court adopts the narrower interpretation based on both a careful reading of the language and context of the statute and its “tradition[] of “exercis[ing] restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute.” (Slip op. 17).
COA: license suspension for 25 over in a 55 applies where 55 is posted
State v. Tisha Lee Love, 2022AP1422, 12/30/22, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Love appeals a jury verdict rendered against her for driving 87 miles per hour in a 55 zone.
State v. Corey T. Rector, 2020AP1213, certification granted 2/16/22
On review of a court of appeals certification; affirmed 5/23/23; case activity (including briefs);
Issue:
Whether Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1, which mandates lifetime sex-offender registration where a person has been convicted of a sex offense “on 2 or more separate occasions,” applies when a person’s only eligible convictions are entered on multiple guilty pleas in the same case.
Court of appeals continues to constrict expunction statute
State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2020 WI App 59; case activity (including briefs); review granted 11/18/2020, affirmed, 2021 WI 60
This is not much of a surprise after State v. Ozuna, but the court of appeals here reverses a grant of expunction, holding in a to-be-published decision that any noncompliance with conditions of probation–even those that are not ordered by the court, but are imposed by DOC rule–makes expunction unavailable.
SCOW: waiver in any county means adult jurisdiction in every county
State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)
We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?
Identity theft doesn’t require some extra act of “representing” in addition to “use” of identifying documents
State v. Christopher A. Mason, 2018 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)
Applying its newly minted decision in State v. Stewart, 2018 WI App 41, the court of appeals holds that the “representing” element of identity theft under § 943.201 can be proven with the same evidence that proves the defendant “used” the identifying information or documents.
SCOW: Madison can’t ban weapons on city buses; statutes don’t mean what they say
Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, 3/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2015WI App 74, case activity (including briefs)
Justice Kelly’s maiden majority opinion opens with a 4-page discussion of a subject both parties disavowed–the Second Amendment right to bear arms. According to the briefs, this case posed only an issue of statutory interpretation–essentially, whether §66.0409, which governs the “local regulation of weapons,” preempts a City of Madison Transit and Parking Commission rule that prohibits people from carrying weapons, including guns, on City buses.
By the end of the primer on the 2nd Amendment, you can predict the result: A 5-2 opinion reversing a unanimous court of appeals decision holding that §66.0409(2)’s plain language applies to a “political subsdivision’s” “ordinances” or “resolutions” not to a Transit Commission “rule” banning weapons. But you might not predict that the majority opinion would dial back the conservative “strict constructionist” approach to statutory interpretation adopted in State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County. Henceforth, a statute’s text should be no obstacle to the interpretation you desire.
Divna Maslenjak v. United States, USSC No. 16-309, cert. granted 1/13/2017
Question presented:
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, that a naturalized American citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement.