On Point: B. Construction

State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity

A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).

Kevin Loughrin v. United States, USSC No. 13-316, 2014 WL 2807180 (June 23, 2014), affirming United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that split the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that the section of the federal bank fraud statute that prohibits “knowingly execut[ing] a scheme … to obtain” property owned by, or under the custody of, a bank “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,” 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), requires only that the defendant intend to obtain bank property and that this end is accomplished “by means of” a false statement. Nothing in the statute requires proof of intent to defraud or deceive a bank.

Abramski v. United States, USSC No. 12-1493, 2014 WL 2676779 (June 16, 2014), affirming United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the prohibition in 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(6) against making false statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a firearm applies to a “straw” purchaser—a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself—even if the true buyer could have purchased the gun legally.

On review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

When, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015, a sentencing court orders the expunction of a defendant’s record upon successful completion of his sentence, does expunction occur automatically upon the circuit court clerk’s receipt of the defendant’s certificate of discharge or must the defendant file a petition for expunction?

If the defendant must petition the circuit court for expunction, then: (a) is there a deadline by which he must file it, and (b) who is required to forward the certificate of discharge to the circuit court—the defendant or the Department of Corrections (or other detaining authority)?

If a defendant successfully completes his sentence or probation, thereby earning expunction, may the circuit court revoke the grant of expunction based upon the defendant’s post-discharge conduct?

Carol Anne Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-148 (June 2, 2014), reversing United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3rd Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Avoiding a constitutional question about the limits on Congress’s power to pass legislation implementing an international treaty, a majority of the Supreme Court narrowly construes a federal statute enacted after ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention so that it does not cover the defendant’s conduct in this case. By limiting the statute’s reach, the Court’s construction will preclude federal prosecutors from using it to charge “a purely local crime[.]” (Slip op. at 2).

State v. Kearney Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed 2014 WI 129; case activity Every so often there’s an opinion that makes you shake your head in disbelief.  This is one of them. Hemp was convicted with 1 count of possession with intent to deliver THC, aka hemp.  A court granted […]

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity Issue:  Whether under § 973.015 the circuit court has the discretion to withhold its decision on expungement until after the defendant completes probation? Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to expunge the record of a defendant under the age of 25 in certain situations. […]

State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2013 WI App 63, petition for review granted, affirmed, 2014 WI 27; case activity The plain language of § 973.015 requires the circuit court to decide at the time of sentencing whether the defendant’s conviction can be expunged on successful completion of the sentence:  ¶9        Matasek is correct that Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1)(a) grants a court discretion […]

Village of Spring Green v. Michael D. Deignan, 2012AP1303, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity The court of appeals rejects the claim that § 175.40(6), which authorizes an officer to arrest or provide aid or assistance anywhere in the state under written inter-agency agreements, should govern the lawfulness […]

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation: ¶14      …  We […]