On Point: B. Construction

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue:  Whether under § 973.015 the circuit court has the discretion to withhold its decision on expungement until after the defendant completes probation?

Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to expunge the record of a defendant under the age of 25 in certain situations. Matasek says the statute gives the circuit court discretion to defer its expunction decision until after the offender successfully completes probation.

State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2013 WI App 63, petition for review granted, affirmed, 2014 WI 27; case activity

The plain language of § 973.015 requires the circuit court to decide at the time of sentencing whether the defendant’s conviction can be expunged on successful completion of the sentence:

 ¶9        Matasek is correct that Wis.

Village of Spring Green v. Michael D. Deignan, 2012AP1303, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects the claim that § 175.40(6), which authorizes an officer to arrest or provide aid or assistance anywhere in the state under written inter-agency agreements, should govern the lawfulness of defendant’s arrest because it is more specific than Wis. Stat. § 175.40(2), which authorizes an officer to arrest while engaging “in fresh pursuit” anywhere in the state:

¶14      ….

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity

Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:

¶14      …  We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,

Cesar Deleon v. Circuit Court for Brown County, 2012AP278, District 3, 10/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Summary Contempt, §§ 785.01(1)(a), 785.04(2)(b) – “Unit” of Sanctionable Conduct 

Separate, consecutive punishments meted out for each of 11 profane utterances and 1 act of spitting during brief exchange with judge upheld, against argument they “amounted only to a single act of contempt because they took place during a short period of time.”

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Company, 2012 WI 26; case activity

¶32  … The word “may” is ordinarily used to grant permission or to indicate possibility.  See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1112 (3d ed. 1992).  Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, we generally construe the word “may” as permissive.  Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 78 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 254 N.W.2d 230 (1977); 

State v. Dylan S. / Renee B., 2012 WI App 25 (recommended for publication); for Dylan S.: Devon M. Lee, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity;  for Renee B.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Delinquency – Sanctions – Municipal Truancy 

After finding the juveniles in violation of  first-offense truancy under the local municipal code, the trial court set compliance conditions. The court did not,

Madison Metropolitan School District v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2011 WI 72, affirming summary order; case activity

Juvenile Delinquency Disposition – Expelled Student

A juvenile delinquency court lacks authority to order a school district to provide educational services to a delinquent whom the district has expelled.

¶5   We conclude:

…

(2)  A circuit court does not have statutory authority to order a school district to provide alternative educational services to a juvenile who has been expelled from school by a lawful and unchallenged expulsion order but is still residing in the community.

Steven T. Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2011 WI 65; case activity

Statutory Construction – Legislative Acquiesence

¶30 n. 12:

“Legislative failure to act is ordinarily weak evidence of legislative intention to acquiesce in or countenance a judicial or executive branch interpretation. . . . Under proper circumstances, however, inaction by the legislature may be evidence of legislative intent.”  Schill v.

State v. Beverly H., 2011AP536, District 1, 6/21/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Beverly H.: Jeffrey W. Jensen; case activity

The trial court didn’t err in denying the parent’s request for an adjournment of dispositional hearing, following jury verdict finding grounds to terminate. The court of appeals rejects the argument that § 48.31(7)(a) controls the issue.

¶2        This Court disagrees with Beverly H.’s arguments on appeal.