On Point: 39. Statutes

Village of Spring Green v. Michael D. Deignan, 2012AP1303, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects the claim that § 175.40(6), which authorizes an officer to arrest or provide aid or assistance anywhere in the state under written inter-agency agreements, should govern the lawfulness of defendant’s arrest because it is more specific than Wis. Stat. § 175.40(2), which authorizes an officer to arrest while engaging “in fresh pursuit” anywhere in the state:

¶14      ….

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity

Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:

¶14      …  We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,

Cesar Deleon v. Circuit Court for Brown County, 2012AP278, District 3, 10/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Summary Contempt, §§ 785.01(1)(a), 785.04(2)(b) – “Unit” of Sanctionable Conduct 

Separate, consecutive punishments meted out for each of 11 profane utterances and 1 act of spitting during brief exchange with judge upheld, against argument they “amounted only to a single act of contempt because they took place during a short period of time.”

State v. Nathan J. Meinhardt, 2012 WI App 82 (recommended for publication); case activity

Amendments to § 973.015(1)(a) (2009-10), which expanded the offender’s age-ceiling and the eligible pool of offenses, doesn’t apply retroactively.

¶3        The determinative issue in this case is whether the circuit court has the authority to apply the amended version of Wis. Stat.§ 973.015(1)(a) retroactively to Meinhardt’s case.  The question of whether a statute can be applied retroactively is a question of law which this court reviews de novo.  

Panagis Vartelas v. Holder, USSC No. 10-1211, 3/28/12, reversing, 620 F.3d 108 (2nd Cir. 2010)

Vartelas, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in 1994 to an offense that under then-settled law didn’t hinder his ability to take brief trips abroad. Congress, however, subsequently enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“Act”), which did place his resident status at risk if he ever left the country.

Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Company, 2012 WI 26; case activity

¶32  … The word “may” is ordinarily used to grant permission or to indicate possibility.  See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1112 (3d ed. 1992).  Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, we generally construe the word “may” as permissive.  Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 78 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 254 N.W.2d 230 (1977); 

State v. Dylan S. / Renee B., 2012 WI App 25 (recommended for publication); for Dylan S.: Devon M. Lee, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity;  for Renee B.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Delinquency – Sanctions – Municipal Truancy 

After finding the juveniles in violation of  first-offense truancy under the local municipal code, the trial court set compliance conditions. The court did not,

Question Presented (composed by Scotusblog): 

Whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applies in an initial sentencing proceeding that takes place on or after the statute’s effective date if the offense occurred before that date.

Hill: Scotusblog page; consolidated with Dorsey (lower court decision: United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011))

The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

Madison Metropolitan School District v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2011 WI 72, affirming summary order; case activity

Juvenile Delinquency Disposition – Expelled Student

A juvenile delinquency court lacks authority to order a school district to provide educational services to a delinquent whom the district has expelled.

¶5   We conclude:

…

(2)  A circuit court does not have statutory authority to order a school district to provide alternative educational services to a juvenile who has been expelled from school by a lawful and unchallenged expulsion order but is still residing in the community.

Steven T. Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2011 WI 65; case activity

Statutory Construction – Legislative Acquiesence

¶30 n. 12:

“Legislative failure to act is ordinarily weak evidence of legislative intention to acquiesce in or countenance a judicial or executive branch interpretation. . . . Under proper circumstances, however, inaction by the legislature may be evidence of legislative intent.”  Schill v.