On Point blog, page 9 of 12
SCOTUS: “Straw” purchase prohibition applies even when true purchaser may lawfully own gun
Abramski v. United States, USSC No. 12-1493, 2014 WL 2676779 (June 16, 2014), affirming United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the prohibition in 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(6) against making false statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a firearm applies to a “straw” purchaser—a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself—even if the true buyer could have purchased the gun legally.
State v. Kearney Hemp, 2013AP1163, petition for review granted 6/12/14
On review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
When, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015, a sentencing court orders the expunction of a defendant’s record upon successful completion of his sentence, does expunction occur automatically upon the circuit court clerk’s receipt of the defendant’s certificate of discharge or must the defendant file a petition for expunction?
If the defendant must petition the circuit court for expunction, then: (a) is there a deadline by which he must file it, and (b) who is required to forward the certificate of discharge to the circuit court—the defendant or the Department of Corrections (or other detaining authority)?
If a defendant successfully completes his sentence or probation, thereby earning expunction, may the circuit court revoke the grant of expunction based upon the defendant’s post-discharge conduct?
SCOTUS reads chemical weapons statute narrowly, avoiding constitutional issue
Carol Anne Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-148 (June 2, 2014), reversing United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3rd Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Avoiding a constitutional question about the limits on Congress’s power to pass legislation implementing an international treaty, a majority of the Supreme Court narrowly construes a federal statute enacted after ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention so that it does not cover the defendant’s conduct in this case. By limiting the statute’s reach, the Court’s construction will preclude federal prosecutors from using it to charge “a purely local crime[.]” (Slip op. at 2).
Implied consent law covering drivers not arrested for OWI is constitutional; defendant’s consent to blood draw was voluntary
State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity
The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.
Sec. 973.015 expunction denied based on new, court-imposed deadline and filing requirements
State v. Kearney Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed 2014 WI 129; case activity
Every so often there’s an opinion that makes you shake your head in disbelief. This is one of them.
Hemp was convicted with 1 count of possession with intent to deliver THC, aka hemp. A court granted conditional jail time,
State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2012AP1582, petition for review granted
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue: Whether under § 973.015 the circuit court has the discretion to withhold its decision on expungement until after the defendant completes probation?
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to expunge the record of a defendant under the age of 25 in certain situations. Matasek says the statute gives the circuit court discretion to defer its expunction decision until after the offender successfully completes probation.
County ordinance prohibiting squealing of tires not unconstitutionally vague, so traffic stop based on suspicion of violation of ordinance was reasonable
State v. Michael E. Mauermann, 2012AP2568-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Iowa County Ordinance § 600.08 provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as to make any loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise in or about any public street, alley, park or private residence which may tend to annoy or disturb another by causing the tires of said vehicle to squeal,
Court must decide at the time of sentencing whether a conviction may be expunged under § 973.015(1)(a)
State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2013 WI App 63, petition for review granted, affirmed, 2014 WI 27; case activity
The plain language of § 973.015 requires the circuit court to decide at the time of sentencing whether the defendant’s conviction can be expunged on successful completion of the sentence:
¶9 Matasek is correct that Wis.
Indiana ban on sex offenders using social networking and social media sites violates First Amendment
Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana, Case No. 12-2512, 1/23/13; Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
A recent Indiana statute prohibits most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, and chat programs. John Doe, on behalf of a class of similarly situated sex offenders, challenges this law on First Amendment grounds. We reverse the district court and hold that the law as drafted is unconstitutional. Though content neutral,
Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-158, cert granted 1/18/13
1. Do the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations?
2. Can the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act,