On Point blog, page 9 of 11
Sec. 973.015 expunction denied based on new, court-imposed deadline and filing requirements
State v. Kearney Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed 2014 WI 129; case activity
Every so often there’s an opinion that makes you shake your head in disbelief. This is one of them.
Hemp was convicted with 1 count of possession with intent to deliver THC, aka hemp. A court granted conditional jail time,
State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2012AP1582, petition for review granted
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue: Whether under § 973.015 the circuit court has the discretion to withhold its decision on expungement until after the defendant completes probation?
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to expunge the record of a defendant under the age of 25 in certain situations. Matasek says the statute gives the circuit court discretion to defer its expunction decision until after the offender successfully completes probation.
County ordinance prohibiting squealing of tires not unconstitutionally vague, so traffic stop based on suspicion of violation of ordinance was reasonable
State v. Michael E. Mauermann, 2012AP2568-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Iowa County Ordinance § 600.08 provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as to make any loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise in or about any public street, alley, park or private residence which may tend to annoy or disturb another by causing the tires of said vehicle to squeal,
Court must decide at the time of sentencing whether a conviction may be expunged under § 973.015(1)(a)
State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2013 WI App 63, petition for review granted, affirmed, 2014 WI 27; case activity
The plain language of § 973.015 requires the circuit court to decide at the time of sentencing whether the defendant’s conviction can be expunged on successful completion of the sentence:
¶9 Matasek is correct that Wis.
Indiana ban on sex offenders using social networking and social media sites violates First Amendment
Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana, Case No. 12-2512, 1/23/13; Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
A recent Indiana statute prohibits most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, and chat programs. John Doe, on behalf of a class of similarly situated sex offenders, challenges this law on First Amendment grounds. We reverse the district court and hold that the law as drafted is unconstitutional. Though content neutral,
Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-158, cert granted 1/18/13
1. Do the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations?
2. Can the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act,
Arrest – police officer acting outside of his jurisdiction; fresh pursuit versus mutual aid, § 175.40(2) and (6); sufficiency of evidence of fresh pursuit
Village of Spring Green v. Michael D. Deignan, 2012AP1303, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects the claim that § 175.40(6), which authorizes an officer to arrest or provide aid or assistance anywhere in the state under written inter-agency agreements, should govern the lawfulness of defendant’s arrest because it is more specific than Wis. Stat. § 175.40(2), which authorizes an officer to arrest while engaging “in fresh pursuit” anywhere in the state:
¶14 ….
Sentencing Sexual Assault-Child, § 948.02(1)(b): Mandatory Min., Probation-Ineligible
State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity
Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:
¶14 … We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,
Summary Contempt, §§ 785.01(1)(a), 785.04(2)(b); Conduct Prompted by the Court
Cesar Deleon v. Circuit Court for Brown County, 2012AP278, District 3, 10/10/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Summary Contempt, §§ 785.01(1)(a), 785.04(2)(b) – “Unit” of Sanctionable Conduct
Separate, consecutive punishments meted out for each of 11 profane utterances and 1 act of spitting during brief exchange with judge upheld, against argument they “amounted only to a single act of contempt because they took place during a short period of time.”
Sentencing, Expungement, § 973.015(1)(a) (2009-10): Retroactivity
State v. Nathan J. Meinhardt, 2012 WI App 82 (recommended for publication); case activity
Amendments to § 973.015(1)(a) (2009-10), which expanded the offender’s age-ceiling and the eligible pool of offenses, doesn’t apply retroactively.
¶3 The determinative issue in this case is whether the circuit court has the authority to apply the amended version of Wis. Stat.§ 973.015(1)(a) retroactively to Meinhardt’s case. The question of whether a statute can be applied retroactively is a question of law which this court reviews de novo.