On Point blog, page 10 of 15
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to argue it was impossible for parent to assume parental duties
Dane County DHS v. D.M., 2014AP2291, District 4, 7/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for arguing § 48.415(6) is unconstitutional as applied to D.M., as she fails to demonstrate that the County made it impossible for her to satisfy the conditions for return of her child, D.L.
Court declines to decide constitutional challenges to § 48.415(4)(a)
Derrick P. v. Anita P., 2014AP2570 & 2014AP2571, District 4, 7/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Anita P. raised equal protection and due process challenges to § 48.415(4)(a) for the first time on appeal, and the court of appeals finds it’s not in the interest of justice to decide the challenges. We describe the issues in more detail below, since practitioners handling TPR cases arising out of placement denials in family court may want to consider raising them (in the trial court first, of course).
Trial counsel in TPR reasonably advised incarcerated parent to admit grounds for termination
Kenosha County DHS v. A.C., 2015AP151, District 2, 7/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel for A.C. in his TPR proceeding wasn’t ineffective for failing to tell A.C. that his incarceration was not enough by itself to terminate his parental rights or for failing to challenge the TPR proceeding on the basis that the grounds were unconstitutional as applied to A.C. because, based on his incarceration, the conditions for return were impossible to meet.
Conditions for child’s return were sufficiently narrow to satisfy due process
State v. Kiwana L., 2014AP2306, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Kiwana L.’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the conditions set by the circuit court for return of her daughter Jasmine because those conditions were narrowly tailored to address her mental health issues; thus, the termination of her parental rights based on continuing CHIPS grounds under § 48.415(2) was proper.
Sec. 805.01(3) now governs requests to withdraw jury demands in TPR proceedings
Racine County HSD v . Latasia D.M., 2014AP1672/1673, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The stand out in this multi-issue TPR case is whether the circuit court erred in denying Latasia’s permission to withdraw her jury demand. The court of appeals answered “no” because even though § 48.31(2) and §48.422(4) set forth the procedures for demanding a jury in a TPR case, the general civil procedure statute, § 805.01(3), governs the withdrawal of a jury demand. The latter statute requires the consent of all the parties, which Latasia did not have.
Mother received required warnings of potential termination of parental rights
Portage County DHHS v. Julie G., 2014AP1057, District 4, 7/31/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The record shows Julie received the warnings required under § 48.356 even though the relevant notice form did not have her signature. In addition, Julie’s substantive due process rights were not violated because the conditions for return of her child imposed by the continuing CHIPS order were not impossible for her to meet despite her incarceration.
TPR based on continuing denial of periods of placement and disposition didn’t violate due process
Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46
Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.
Parents in TPR proceeding not prejudiced by GAL’s connections to judge and prior representation of child at CHIPS hearing
Manitowoc County Human Services Dep’t v. Rebecca H, 2013AP421/422; 1/22/14; District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This is an appeal from an order terminating a couple’s parental rights to their daughter. They claimed their trial lawyer provided ineffective of assistance of counsel by failing to object to the admission of various types of evidence. The court of appeals quickly disposed of those errors through repeated findings that counsel’s performance was not deficient–which is one of the two requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel per A.S.
Termination of rights of cognitively disabled parent didn’t violate due process
State v. Lawanda R., 2013AP1661, District 1/4, 1/16/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly found that a parent with serious cognitive disabilities (she “functions at the level of a child less than ten years old” (¶8)) was unfit under § 48.415(2) on the sole basis that she failed to meet the conditions established by a continuing CHIPS order for the return of Will,
Reference to “best interests of the child” during grounds phase of TPR deemed not prejudicial
Winnebago County DHS v. Christina M.C., 2013AP1519/1520; District 2; 11/27/13 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
In the initial “grounds” stage of this TPR, the County and the GAL made several veiled references, plus one explicit reference, to the “bests of the child,” a topic that’s not to be addressed until stage 2. Christina moved to set aside the finding that she is unfit as a parent, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these comments.