On Point blog, page 10 of 15
Sec. 805.01(3) now governs requests to withdraw jury demands in TPR proceedings
Racine County HSD v . Latasia D.M., 2014AP1672/1673, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The stand out in this multi-issue TPR case is whether the circuit court erred in denying Latasia’s permission to withdraw her jury demand. The court of appeals answered “no” because even though § 48.31(2) and §48.422(4) set forth the procedures for demanding a jury in a TPR case, the general civil procedure statute, § 805.01(3), governs the withdrawal of a jury demand. The latter statute requires the consent of all the parties, which Latasia did not have.
Mother received required warnings of potential termination of parental rights
Portage County DHHS v. Julie G., 2014AP1057, District 4, 7/31/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The record shows Julie received the warnings required under § 48.356 even though the relevant notice form did not have her signature. In addition, Julie’s substantive due process rights were not violated because the conditions for return of her child imposed by the continuing CHIPS order were not impossible for her to meet despite her incarceration.
TPR based on continuing denial of periods of placement and disposition didn’t violate due process
Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46
Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.
Parents in TPR proceeding not prejudiced by GAL’s connections to judge and prior representation of child at CHIPS hearing
Manitowoc County Human Services Dep’t v. Rebecca H, 2013AP421/422; 1/22/14; District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This is an appeal from an order terminating a couple’s parental rights to their daughter. They claimed their trial lawyer provided ineffective of assistance of counsel by failing to object to the admission of various types of evidence. The court of appeals quickly disposed of those errors through repeated findings that counsel’s performance was not deficient–which is one of the two requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel per A.S.
Termination of rights of cognitively disabled parent didn’t violate due process
State v. Lawanda R., 2013AP1661, District 1/4, 1/16/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly found that a parent with serious cognitive disabilities (she “functions at the level of a child less than ten years old” (¶8)) was unfit under § 48.415(2) on the sole basis that she failed to meet the conditions established by a continuing CHIPS order for the return of Will,
Reference to “best interests of the child” during grounds phase of TPR deemed not prejudicial
Winnebago County DHS v. Christina M.C., 2013AP1519/1520; District 2; 11/27/13 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
In the initial “grounds” stage of this TPR, the County and the GAL made several veiled references, plus one explicit reference, to the “bests of the child,” a topic that’s not to be addressed until stage 2. Christina moved to set aside the finding that she is unfit as a parent, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these comments.
TPR: Waiver of jury and stipulation to elements doesn’t survive subsequent appeal, reversal, and remand
Walworth County DH&HS v. Roberta J.W., 2013 WI App 102; consolidated case activity: 2012AP2387; 2012AP2388
The County petitioned to terminate Roberta’s parental rights in 2007 on the grounds her children were in continuing need of protection and services. After a jury trial and dispositional hearing her rights were terminated, but on appeal the termination order was reversed and remanded for a new fact-finding hearing. (¶4).
TPR — Effective assistance of counsel at fact-finding hearing
Jenna L.C. v. Dustin J.K.V., 2012AP2696, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Dustin’s claim that his attorney was ineffective at the fact-finding hearing on a TPR petition alleging he had failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter, Breyanna.
Trial counsel did not object to certain evidence about conduct Dustin allegedly engaged in shortly before he learned his girlfriend was pregnant with Breyanna.
Court of Appeals Enforces Stipulation to Forgo Appeal in TPR Case; Denies Discretionary Reversal
Ronald J.R. v. Alexis L.A., 2013 WI App 79; case activity
This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment decision finding grounds to terminate Alexis L.A.’s parental rights. The father, Ronald J.R., sought termination on two grounds and won summary judgment on the first one. The parties then stipulated that Ronald would withdraw the second ground, if Alexis would agree not to appeal the partial summary judgment on the first ground.
Wisconsin Supreme Court: New fact-finding hearing before a jury is the proper remedy for erroneous grant of default judgment due to parent’s tardy appearance at second day of trial
Dane County DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, reversing court of appeals summary order; case activity
¶3 We conclude, and the circuit court has acknowledged, that it erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered a default judgment finding that grounds existed to terminate Mable K.’s parental rights after barring her attorney from offering additional evidence. It also erred when it granted the default judgment before taking evidence sufficient to establish the grounds alleged in the amended petitions.