On Point: B. Constitutional rights

Dane County DHS v. J.D., 2015AP1800, District 4, 11/19/2015 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

One of the statutory grounds for a finding of unfitness leading to termination of parental rights is the court-ordered denial of placement or visitation for at least one year. Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4). In Dane County DHS v. P. P., 2005 WI 32, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344, the supreme court rejected a facial challenge to this ground but left open the possibility that, as applied, it might violate substantive due process in a particular case. Per the court of appeals, this is not that case.

State v. L.M.-N., 2014AP2405 & 2014AP2406, District 1/4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly entered a default judgment in L.M.-N.’s termination of parental rights proceeding based on her failure to appear at her scheduled deposition and, when she did finally appear, by refusing to testify.

State v. T.P., 2015AP857, District 1, 8/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Recently enacted statutes allow a circuit court to presume that a parent in a TPR proceeding has waived the right to counsel if, after being ordered to appear in court, the parent fails to do so and the court finds that failure egregious and without a justifiable excuse. The circuit court’s application of those statutes in this case didn’t violate the parent’s due process rights.

Dane County DHS v. D.M., 2014AP2291, District 4, 7/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for arguing § 48.415(6) is unconstitutional as applied to D.M., as she fails to demonstrate that the County made it impossible for her to satisfy the conditions for return of her child, D.L.

Derrick P. v. Anita P., 2014AP2570 & 2014AP2571, District 4, 7/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Anita P. raised equal protection and due process challenges to § 48.415(4)(a) for the first time on appeal, and the court of appeals finds it’s not in the interest of justice to decide the challenges. We describe the issues in more detail below, since practitioners handling TPR cases arising out of placement denials in family court may want to consider raising them (in the trial court first, of course).

Kenosha County DHS v. A.C., 2015AP151, District 2, 7/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel for A.C. in his TPR proceeding wasn’t ineffective for failing to tell A.C. that his incarceration was not enough by itself to terminate his parental rights or for failing to challenge the TPR proceeding on the basis that the grounds were unconstitutional as applied to A.C. because, based on his incarceration, the conditions for return were impossible to meet.

State v. Kiwana L., 2014AP2306, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kiwana L.’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the conditions set by the circuit court for return of her daughter Jasmine because those conditions were narrowly tailored to address her mental health issues; thus, the termination of her parental rights based on continuing CHIPS grounds under § 48.415(2) was proper.

Racine County HSD v . Latasia D.M., 2014AP1672/1673, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The stand out in this multi-issue TPR case is whether the circuit court erred in denying Latasia’s permission to withdraw her jury demand. The court of appeals answered “no” because even though § 48.31(2) and §48.422(4) set forth the procedures for demanding a jury in a TPR case, the general civil procedure statute, § 805.01(3), governs the withdrawal of a jury demand. The latter statute requires the consent of all the parties, which Latasia did not have.

Portage County DHHS v. Julie G., 2014AP1057, District 4, 7/31/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows Julie received the warnings required under § 48.356 even though the relevant notice form did not have her signature. In addition, Julie’s substantive due process rights were not violated because the conditions for return of her child imposed by the continuing CHIPS order were not impossible for her to meet despite her incarceration.

Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46

Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.