On Point: F. Fact-finding, Sec. 48.424

State v. D.W. Jr., 2022AP1397, 10/18/22, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

D.W. Jr. has along criminal history. He was incarcerated when his son, J.W., was born, and the two had never lived together. In fact, J.W. and his brother lived with a foster parent, who was also an adoptive resource for both of them. When the circuit court terminated D.W.’ Jr.’s parental rights, he argued that the court neglected to consider a dispositional alternative– the appointment of a guardian for J.W. It didn’t fly.

Juneau County D.H.S. v. R.M., 2022AP1260, 9/29/22, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.M. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son, M.M.

State v. J.W., 2022AP1338, District 1, 10/4/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.W.’s challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at both the grounds and dispositional phases of the proceeding that terminated his parental rights to J.W., Jr. The court of appeals rejects his arguments.

State v. Q.M., 2022AP1245, District 1, 10/4/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Q.M. challenges the termination of her parental rights to J.W., arguing the circuit court erred in depriving her of the right to present evidence at the disposition hearing. The court of appeals rejects the challenge.

State v. J.D.C., Jr., 2022AP1028, District 1, 9/27/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects J.D.C.’s claim that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in deciding that termination of J.D.C.’s parental rights was in the best interest of his parental rights to C.M.M.

Brown County DHS v. K.Y.T., 2022AP531, District 3, 9/27/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The county petitioned to terminate K.Y.T.’s parental rights to M.Z. alleging abandonment for both a 3-month and a 6-month period and failure to assume parental responsibility.  The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that the county proved both grounds.

State v. D.T., 2022AP909, 8/23/22, District 1 (oen-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.T. showed up late for his Zoom TPR trial. It had been set for 9:00; D.T. appeared at 11:00 and said he was having eye trouble that kept him from logging in. The circuit court defaulted him and declined to vacate that default. The court of appeals affirms, noting that D.T. had missed other hearings.

State v. S.S.M., 2022AP524 & 2022AP525, District 1, 8/2/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 48.415(intro.), termination of parental rights to children subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires, in addition to proof of one or more grounds for termination under subs. (1) to (10), proof of “active efforts,” as defined in § 48.028(4)(e)2., to prevent the breakup of the family as well as the unsuccess of those efforts. S.S.M., whose children are not subject to the ICWA, argues that the statute’s failure to require proof of active efforts in all TPR cases violates the right to equal protection the statute because it gives Indian parents greater protection from having their parental rights involuntarily terminated than it does non-Indian parents. The court of appeals rejects the claim.

State v. S.G., 2022AP585-587, 7/19/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

S.G. argued that the circuit court failed to address 2 of the 6 “best interest” factors in §48.426(3) when it terminated her parental rights to her 3 sons. According to the court of appeals, the record proves otherwise.

State v. M.B., 2022AP89, District 1, 7/19/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.B. entered a no contest plea to failing to assume parental responsibility and to her daughter being in continuing need of protection or services. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court suggested she had the “same trial rights” at the dispositional phase as at the grounds phase. (¶¶3-4). This, M.B. argues, was a flaw in the colloquy because it misstated the correct statutory standard to be applied at disposition—the best interests of the child—and suggests the state had a burden it doesn’t have; thus, she should be allowed to withdraw her plea. (¶¶11, 13). The court of appeals disagrees.