On Point blog, page 4 of 5
Court of Appeals Enforces Stipulation to Forgo Appeal in TPR Case; Denies Discretionary Reversal
Ronald J.R. v. Alexis L.A., 2013 WI App 79; case activity
This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment decision finding grounds to terminate Alexis L.A.’s parental rights. The father, Ronald J.R., sought termination on two grounds and won summary judgment on the first one. The parties then stipulated that Ronald would withdraw the second ground, if Alexis would agree not to appeal the partial summary judgment on the first ground.
TPR – Meaningful Cross-Examination, § 906.11(1)
La Crosse Co. DHS v. Kristle S., 2012AP2005, District 4, 11/21/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The parent was given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the social worker with respect to conditions for the children’s return, in that the trial court permitted extensive questioning on these issues before instructing counsel to pursue a different line of questioning:
¶17 Our review of the record also demonstrates that Kristle had a meaningful opportunity to impeach Simmons’ credibility.
TPR – Withdrawal of Admission
Nicole P. v. Michael P., 2012AP780, District 3, 10/16/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Father’s motion to withdraw admission to grounds (based on asserted lack of understanding that: termination of parental rights required an unfitness determination; sole focus of dispositional hearing would be child’s best interests, with no concern for parent’s own interests; disposition could result in permanent extinction of all his parental rights),
Dane Co. DHS v. Mable K., 2011AP825, petition for review granted, 5/3/12
on review of summary order of court of appeals; for Mable K.: Brian C. Findley; case activity
TPR – Final Order – Appellate Standing
Issues (from Petition for Review):
I. When a trial court grants partial relief on remand in a Termination of Parental Rights appeal, is further appeal precluded by the ordinary rules of civil procedure?
II. Where the trial court determines that it denied the right to counsel during a TPR trial,
TPR – Evidence – Child’s Mental Health Problems; Prior Voluntary Termination – Harmless Error
Rock County HSD v. Jennifer B., 2011AP1524, District 4, 9/8/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer B.: Gina Frances Bosben; case activity
Evidence of the child’s diagnoses (ADHD; PTSD) was relevant to the main issue in contention, and was not unduly prejudicial, hence was admissible in the grounds phase of the TPR trial.
¶15 The question for the jury was whether there was a substantial likelihood that Jennifer would not “meet the child’s physical,
TPR – Mootness
Kenosha County DHS v. Amber D., 2011AP667, District 2, 9/7/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Amber D.: Philip J, Brehm; case activity
Mother’s termination appeal, explicitly linking itself to outcome of father’s then-pending appeal, rendered moot by latter’s unsuccessful outcome:
¶1 Amber D. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. At the time that she wrote her brief, the father’s appeal was pending.
TPR – Sufficiency of Evidence; Oral Instructions: Timing; Counsel – Presence, Return of Verdict
Kevin G. v. Jennifer M. S., 2009AP1377, District 4, 8/17/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer M.S.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Evidence held sufficient to support termination for failure to assume parental responsibility, § 48.415(6)(a), applying “totality-of-the-circumstances test” where “the fact-finder should consider any support or care, or lack thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the child’s entire life,” Tammy W-G.
TPR – Default as Sanction; Formal Advice as to Rights – Harmless Error
State v. Marquita R., 2010AP1981, District 1, 12/14/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marquita R.: Carl W. Chesshir
TPR – Default as Sanction
Delay of over two-and-one-half years between petition and fact-finding hearing (despite statutorily mandated schedule of 45-day limit, § 48.422(2)), caused by Marquita R.’s “egregious” and “bath faith” conduct, intended to disrupt the TPR process, supported the trial court’s decision to find her in default as a sanction.Nor did the default ruling violate due process,
TPR – Harmless Error
Rock Co. DHS v. Calvin M. M., No. 2010AP816, District IV, 6/24/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Calvin M.M.: Brian C. Findley
Admission of hearsay, describing an act of domestic violence was harmless:
¶7 There are two reasons why we conclude admitting this apparent hearsay evidence was harmless error. We first observe that one of the elements the County had to prove at trial was that Calvin had not met all of the conditions for return.
Peter H. v. Keri H., 2009AP2487, District III, 4/23/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Keri H.: Leonard D. Kachinski
IAC Claim – TPR
“The decision not to emphasize events preceding the current termination petitions was a reasonable strategic choice and does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,” ¶11. Separately: counsel did not perform deficiently in his efforts to obtain Keri H.’s client file from predecessor counsel, and then securing an adjournment to prepare for trial,