On Point: 40. TPRs

Winnebago County Department of Human Services v. N.J.D., 2023AP75, 05/03/2023 (District 2) (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Presented with two strong bases to reverse, the court of appeals picks one and holds that because the record “fails to demonstrate that N.D. waived his right to counsel,” the order terminating his parental rights to his daughter is reversed. (Opinion, ¶1).

Price County v. T.L., 2022AP1678, 4/25/2023, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The law governing default TPRs is messy. Click here. This decision makes it messier.

Brown County Department of Human Services v. S.K., 2023 WI App 27; case activity

A court has grounds to terminate parental rights under §48.415(9m) when the parent commits a “serious felony against a child.” Here, the circuit court found that grounds existed to terminate Stephanie’s parental rights to Robert because she had been convicted of  child neglect resulting in death under but “as a party to the crime.” In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals reversed, but it rejected Stephanie’s argument that an “as a party to the crime” conviction can never qualify as a “serious felony.”

State v. B.L., 2023AP8, 4/11/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Barry” appealed an order terminating his parental rights to his 4 1/2-year-old daughter, Alice. He argued that the circuit court erred in admitting his criminal history during the grounds phase and erred in finding that it was in Alice’s best interest to terminate his rights. He lost on both issues.

State v. N.H., 2022AP1945, District 1, 03/14/2023, (one-judge decision, not eligible for publication) case activity

This case presents a relatively straightforward application of how Bangert applies to termination of parental rights pleas. As noted by the decision, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is currently considering a more nuanced version of the issue in State v. A.G. In Nico’s (N.H.) case, the court of appeals again holds that a circuit court’s incorrect explanation of the applicable statutory standard at disposition entitles the parent to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether the state can prove the parent’s plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Opinion, ¶1.

State v. Y.P.V., 2022AP1935-36, 3/21/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals reversed and remanded this TPR for two reasons. First, the mom made a prima facie case that her “no contest” plea to grounds was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, during the plea colloquy, the circuit court misstated the law that would apply during the disposition. Then, at the disposition phase, the circuit court failed to apply the proper standard of law and misstated an important fact.

State v. Debra L. Rippentrop & Steven E. Rippentrop, 2023 WI App 15; case activity (including briefs) 2022AP92-CR and 2022AP93-CR

The nonprosecution agreement the Rippentrops made with the state doesn’t violate public policy and is therefore enforceable, and that requires the criminal charges filed against them to be dismissed with prejudice.

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

Portage County DH & HS v. C.S., 2022AP1090, District 4, 02/23/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

In what appears to be a first, the court of appeals addresses a grant of partial summary judgment against a parent specifically related to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services pursuant to a CHIPS order. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a). One caveat being that the issue arises within the context of a postdisposition claim of ineffective assistance after trial counsel failed to file any response or affidavit opposing the county’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court affirms the summary judgment order and holds that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services to C.S. that would have assisted him in meeting the conditions of return. (Opinion, ¶35).

Wood County v. P.M.P., 2022AP1815, 2/23/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal, P.M.P.’s sole challenge was to the circuit court’s application of the “best interest of the child” factors in §48.426(3)(a)-(f). P.M.P. conceded that the circuit court adequately considered the “substantial relationship” factor, but its analysis of the other facts was too terse. The decision required reversal under s Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981) and State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed.