On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Y.P.V., 2022AP1935-36, 3/21/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals reversed and remanded this TPR for two reasons. First, the mom made a prima facie case that her “no contest” plea to grounds was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, during the plea colloquy, the circuit court misstated the law that would apply during the disposition. Then, at the disposition phase, the circuit court failed to apply the proper standard of law and misstated an important fact.

State v. Debra L. Rippentrop & Steven E. Rippentrop, 2023 WI App 15; case activity (including briefs) 2022AP92-CR and 2022AP93-CR

The nonprosecution agreement the Rippentrops made with the state doesn’t violate public policy and is therefore enforceable, and that requires the criminal charges filed against them to be dismissed with prejudice.

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

Portage County DH & HS v. C.S., 2022AP1090, District 4, 02/23/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

In what appears to be a first, the court of appeals addresses a grant of partial summary judgment against a parent specifically related to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services pursuant to a CHIPS order. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a). One caveat being that the issue arises within the context of a postdisposition claim of ineffective assistance after trial counsel failed to file any response or affidavit opposing the county’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court affirms the summary judgment order and holds that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services to C.S. that would have assisted him in meeting the conditions of return. (Opinion, ¶35).

Wood County v. P.M.P., 2022AP1815, 2/23/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal, P.M.P.’s sole challenge was to the circuit court’s application of the “best interest of the child” factors in §48.426(3)(a)-(f). P.M.P. conceded that the circuit court adequately considered the “substantial relationship” factor, but its analysis of the other facts was too terse. The decision required reversal under s Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981) and State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed.

R.G. v. S.P., 2022AP1876, District 4, 02/16/2023 (one judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.G. filed a petition to voluntarily terminate his parental rights to a non-marital child that he had not seen in over seven years. The circuit court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. R.G. pursued an appeal pro se, arguing that Wis. Stat. § 48.185 supported his petition in Dane County.

N.D. v. E.S., 2022AP1084, District 2, 01/25/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Nancy (N.D.) petitioned to terminate Ed’s (E.D.’s) parental rights on the grounds that he abandoned their daughter, Kim. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1). At trial, Ed asserted a “good cause” defense that Nancy prevented him from having contact with Kim, and in response, Nancy was allowed to testify that the reason for her interference was Ed’s  “heroin use.” Despite the fact that Nancy had no personal knowledge of Ed’s suspected heroin use, the circuit court ruled, and the court of appeals agrees, that the fact that Ed admitted to being drug tested was sufficient foundation for Nancy’s testimony. As a result, Ed’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to this evidence fails.

Brown County DHHS v. T.R., 2022AP1094, District 3, 1/20/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a TPR proceeding a motion for summary judgment may be filed any time before trial, as prescribed in § 48.297(1) and (2), and is not governed by the time limit for summary judgment motions prescribed in § 802.08(1).

Rusk County DHHS v. R.S., 2022AP1530, District 3, 1/20/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.S. (“Ruth”) argues that at the trial on the County’s petition to terminate her parental rights, the County Department of Health and Human Services didn’t prove it made reasonable efforts to provide the services ordered in the original CHIPS dispositional order. The court of appeals rejects the claim.

State v. O.F., 2022AP1703, District 1, 01/18/2023 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Ultimately, the issue addressed by the court of appeals is whether O.F. received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel was alleged to have “violated his duty of confidentiality and loyalty” to his client. O.F.’s claims were based on multiple statements made by his trial counsel that arguably disclosed confidential information to the court and painted O.F. in a bad light. The court rejects O.F.’s claim primarily because he failed to establish “any prejudice” and also rejects O.F.’s assertions that his IAC claim was structural and thus did not require a post-disposition motion or a Machner evidentiary hearing. (Opinion, ¶¶22-25).