On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. T.M., 2021AP1729, 8/16/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Taylor” presented three challenges to the termination of her parental rights to her son: (1) erroneous admission of a psychological examination; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to a flawed jury instruction; and (3) insufficient evidence. The court of appeals rejected all of them.

Portage County DHHS v. A.K., 2022AP30, District 4, 8/11/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A parent’s failure to raise the issue of the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction as a defense during the TPR proceeding means the issue was waived.

State v. S.S.M., 2022AP524 & 2022AP525, District 1, 8/2/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 48.415(intro.), termination of parental rights to children subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires, in addition to proof of one or more grounds for termination under subs. (1) to (10), proof of “active efforts,” as defined in § 48.028(4)(e)2., to prevent the breakup of the family as well as the unsuccess of those efforts. S.S.M., whose children are not subject to the ICWA, argues that the statute’s failure to require proof of active efforts in all TPR cases violates the right to equal protection the statute because it gives Indian parents greater protection from having their parental rights involuntarily terminated than it does non-Indian parents. The court of appeals rejects the claim.

Brown County v. J.V., 2022AP532, 7/28/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a modified CHIPS dispositional order, the circuit court stated that it was suspending Jennifer’s visitation rights to her son, subject to her completing certain conditions. The court did not orally warn her that her parental rights could be terminated if her visitation rights weren’t reinstated within 1 year. Nor did the written order indicate that her rights could be terminated based on continuing denial of visitation under §§ 48.415(4) and 48.356(2).

Chippewa County Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. J.W.., 2021AP1986, 7/19/22, District  3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Janine” raised an insufficient evidence claim and several ineffective assistance of counsel claims in her appeal from an order terminating her parental right to her son.  This post focuses on two of the IAC claims. Counsel failed to object to (1) portions of the county social worker’s testimony, and (2) new information that the GAL introduced during closing statements.

State v. S.G., 2022AP585-587, 7/19/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

S.G. argued that the circuit court failed to address 2 of the 6 “best interest” factors in §48.426(3) when it terminated her parental rights to her 3 sons. According to the court of appeals, the record proves otherwise.

State v. M.B., 2022AP89, District 1, 7/19/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.B. entered a no contest plea to failing to assume parental responsibility and to her daughter being in continuing need of protection or services. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court suggested she had the “same trial rights” at the dispositional phase as at the grounds phase. (¶¶3-4). This, M.B. argues, was a flaw in the colloquy because it misstated the correct statutory standard to be applied at disposition—the best interests of the child—and suggests the state had a burden it doesn’t have; thus, she should be allowed to withdraw her plea. (¶¶11, 13). The court of appeals disagrees.

Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.

State v. A.G., 2022AP652, 7/12/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); petitions for review granted, 10/11/22, reversed, 2023 WI 61; case activity

District 1 means business. Not long ago, it reversed an order denying A.G.’s claim that his no-contest plea to grounds for a TPR was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the circuit court neglected to explain the potential dispositions to him. It remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. There, the State simply presented a transcript showing that 10 months before the plea, the circuit court explained potential dispositions to A.G. The circuit court said the State met its burden. On appeal after remand, the court of appeals says no way!

State v. A.T., 2022AP544, 6/28/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Guys, if you have unprotected sex, call or text your partner after. And “Wisconsin law does not require courts to consider race or culture when determining whether to terminate parental rights.” Opinion, ¶29. Those are the two main takeaways from this TPR opinion.