On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. D.T., 2022AP909, 8/23/22, District 1 (oen-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.T. showed up late for his Zoom TPR trial. It had been set for 9:00; D.T. appeared at 11:00 and said he was having eye trouble that kept him from logging in. The circuit court defaulted him and declined to vacate that default. The court of appeals affirms, noting that D.T. had missed other hearings.

M.K.S. v. R.J.F., 2021AP1839, 8/16/22, District 1 (no recommended for publication); case activity

Here is a result we don’t often see: a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a TPR case. A jury found grounds to terminate “Richard’s” parental rights. Allegedly, he had failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter, “Morgan.” On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel failed to introduce evidence to explain his lack of contact with Morgan and that he was prevented from establishing a relationship with her. The court of appeals agreed that counsel was ineffective.

State v. T.M., 2021AP1729, 8/16/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Taylor” presented three challenges to the termination of her parental rights to her son: (1) erroneous admission of a psychological examination; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to a flawed jury instruction; and (3) insufficient evidence. The court of appeals rejected all of them.

Portage County DHHS v. A.K., 2022AP30, District 4, 8/11/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A parent’s failure to raise the issue of the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction as a defense during the TPR proceeding means the issue was waived.

State v. S.S.M., 2022AP524 & 2022AP525, District 1, 8/2/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 48.415(intro.), termination of parental rights to children subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires, in addition to proof of one or more grounds for termination under subs. (1) to (10), proof of “active efforts,” as defined in § 48.028(4)(e)2., to prevent the breakup of the family as well as the unsuccess of those efforts. S.S.M., whose children are not subject to the ICWA, argues that the statute’s failure to require proof of active efforts in all TPR cases violates the right to equal protection the statute because it gives Indian parents greater protection from having their parental rights involuntarily terminated than it does non-Indian parents. The court of appeals rejects the claim.

Brown County v. J.V., 2022AP532, 7/28/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a modified CHIPS dispositional order, the circuit court stated that it was suspending Jennifer’s visitation rights to her son, subject to her completing certain conditions. The court did not orally warn her that her parental rights could be terminated if her visitation rights weren’t reinstated within 1 year. Nor did the written order indicate that her rights could be terminated based on continuing denial of visitation under §§ 48.415(4) and 48.356(2).

Chippewa County Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. J.W.., 2021AP1986, 7/19/22, District  3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Janine” raised an insufficient evidence claim and several ineffective assistance of counsel claims in her appeal from an order terminating her parental right to her son.  This post focuses on two of the IAC claims. Counsel failed to object to (1) portions of the county social worker’s testimony, and (2) new information that the GAL introduced during closing statements.

State v. S.G., 2022AP585-587, 7/19/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

S.G. argued that the circuit court failed to address 2 of the 6 “best interest” factors in §48.426(3) when it terminated her parental rights to her 3 sons. According to the court of appeals, the record proves otherwise.

State v. M.B., 2022AP89, District 1, 7/19/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.B. entered a no contest plea to failing to assume parental responsibility and to her daughter being in continuing need of protection or services. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court suggested she had the “same trial rights” at the dispositional phase as at the grounds phase. (¶¶3-4). This, M.B. argues, was a flaw in the colloquy because it misstated the correct statutory standard to be applied at disposition—the best interests of the child—and suggests the state had a burden it doesn’t have; thus, she should be allowed to withdraw her plea. (¶¶11, 13). The court of appeals disagrees.

Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.