On Point blog, page 20 of 59
No error in entering default judgment in TPR based on parent’s conduct
State v. L.C., 2020AP796, District 1, 7/28/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Whether to grant a default judgment in a TPR proceeding as a sanction for a parent’s egregious conduct is left to the circuit court’s discretion, and the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in defaulting L.C.
Challenges to TPR rejected
Racine County HSD v. S.M.F., 2019AP2346 & 2019AP2347, District 2, 7/15/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
S.M.F.’s challenges the order terminating her parental rights, alleging trial counsel was ineffective and that the circuit court should have granted her mistrial motion. The court of appeals affirms.
Parent’s lies to court justified default TPR judgment
Waukesha County HHS v. S.S., 2020AP592, District 2, 6/10/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in ordering default judgment for S.S.’s egregious conduct of lying to the court to get her TPR trial adjourned.
COA affirms partial summary judgment that mom abandoned her son
Juneau County DHS v. C.C., 2020AP438, 6/4/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Courts don’t usually award summary judgment in TPR cases, especially not at the grounds phase where the question is whether the parent abandoned the child. The issue is generally too fact intensive. But here the circuit court found no genuine issue of fact regarding abandonment, and the court of appeals affirmed.
COA rejects claim that court terminated parental rights due to father’s learning disability
State v. J.W., 2020AP161, 5/12/20, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
At the grounds phase of his TPR proceeding J.W. stipulated to the “failure to assume parental responsibility” reason for terminating his parental rights. On appeal he argued that at the trial court erroneously determined that he was unlikely to meet the conditions of return due to a learning disability.
Amendment to continuing CHIPS TPR grounds applies to CHIPS orders issued before amendment
Eau Claire County DHS v. S.E., 2020 WI App 39, petition to review granted, 10/21/20, affirmed, 2021 WI 56; case activity
Following up on the decision issued in Dane County DHS v. J.R., 2020 WI App 5, the court of appeals rejects some additional challenges to the changes 2017 Wis. Act 256 made to the continuing CHIPS ground for terminating parental rights.
Yet another challenge to applying the change in continuing CHIPS grounds to pre-amendment cases
Brown County DHS v. H.P., 2019AP1324 & 2019AP1325, District 3, 5/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
This case involves another challenge to the application of the new version of § 48.415(2)(a)3. in cases where the CHIPS order was entered before the effective date of the amendments. As in Dane County DHS v. J.R., 2020 WI App 5, and Eau Claire County DHS v. S.E., 2019AP894, slip op. recommended for publication (WI App May 13, 2020), the court of appeals rejects the challenges.
Grounds phase TPR trial not tainted by “best interests” or other inadmissible evidence
A.C.-E. v. I.M., 2019AP573, 4/15/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects I.M.’s request for a new TPR grounds trial.
Court didn’t erroneously exercise discretion in terminating parental rights
Waushara County DHS v. A.J.P., 2019AP2387, District 4, 4/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion by considering all the factors under § 48.426(3) when it decided to terminate A.J.P.’s parental rights.
Lawyer’s deficient response to TPR summary judgment motion wasn’t prejudicial
S.L.H. v. J.J.D., 2019AP1554, District 2, 3/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The lawyer representing J.J.D. (“John”) in his TPR proceeding failed to mount a sufficient defense to the summary judgment motion brought by S.L.H. (“Sarah”). But that deficient performance didn’t prejudice John. The evidence the lawyer failed to present wasn’t enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact, so summary judgment would have been granted anyway.