On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. M.W., 2016AP2045 & 2046, 7/11/17, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.W. pled no contest to a continuing CHIPS ground in the initial phase of the termination of her parental rights. She argues on appeal that the court erred in hearing factual basis testimony after her plea colloquy and in finding unfitness when she did not agree with some of the factual basis presented.

State v. A.S.F., 2016AP2076, and State v. V.C., Jr., 2016AP2077, both District 1, 7/11/17 (one-judge decisions ineligible for publication); case activity: A.S.F.; V.C.

In this pair of decisions addressing the termination of the parental rights of both parents of J.T.C., the court of appeals rejects the parents’ claim that it was error to allow J.T.C.’s adoptive parent to testify that she would allow contact between the child and members of his biological family if the court terminated the parents’ rights. The court also rejects V.C.’s argument that the circuit court improperly relied on evidence from A.S.F.’s trial to “prove up” the factual basis for V.C.’s no-contest plea to the petition.

State v. K.P., 2017AP612 & 613, 7/11/2017 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

K.P. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. He argues that the circuit court erred in striking his contest posture and finding him unfit after he failed to show up for the scheduled jury trial on his parental fitness.

State v. S.D., 2016AP1701-1702, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR appeal raises a number of interesting issues ranging from a Daubert challenge to the State’s psychologist and “parenting capacity assessment” to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise an “unconstitutional as applied” challenge to the standard jury instruction on “failure to assume parental responsibility.”

State v. M.G., 2016AP1197, District 1, 7/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.G. moved to withdraw his no contest plea to the petition to terminate his parental rights based on CHIPS grounds. He alleged the plea colloquy was deficient regarding his waiver of the right to trial because his lawyer and the judge referred to his having a “second” trial regarding disposition, and that he was confused by these statements. (¶15). The court of appeals finds no deficiency in the plea colloquy and therefore no basis for plea withdrawal.

State v. F.J.R., 2017AP558 & 559, 6/13/17, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

F.J.R. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. She argues that the court’s pretrial suspension of visitation with one of the children prejudiced her in various ways. The court of appeals disagrees.

Taylor County DHHS v. S.A.L., 2016AP2369, 6/7/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.A.L. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. She alleges ineffective assistance of her trial counsel and that the court failed to properly exercise discretion during the dispositional phase. The court of appeals affirms.

State v. J.L.C., 2017AP197, 5/2/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

J.L.C. argued that the circuit court erroneously terminated his parental rights to his son, K.C., because J.L.C. moved to Arizona, not because J.L.C. failed to provide a safe environment.  

State v. K.C., 2017AP32, District 1, 4/25/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly exercised its discretion when, as a sanction for “egregious” behavior, it defaulted K.C. at the grounds-phase of the trial on the TPR petition filed against her.

State v. D.W., 2016AP1827, 4/11/17, District 1,(1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The briefs in this TPR case are confidential, so we only know what the court of appeals’ opinion tells us about the case. D.W. apparently alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his trial lawyer’s failure to call witnesses and failure to move to have his son’s (A.W.’s) placement changed to a family member. He also argued that his plea was defective. The court of appeals decision is long on facts, short on law, and essentially rubber stamps the Machner court’s findings without analysis.