On Point blog, page 39 of 59
Court properly exercised discretion in severing legal ties of grandmother in TPR disposition
State v. Jasmine W., 2014AP2960 & 2014AP2961, District 1, 3/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP2960; 2014AP2961
The circuit court applied the proper standard of law to the relevant fact when it declined to place Jasmine’s children with their grandmother, found no substantial relationship between the children and their grandmother, and concluded that it would not cause harm to sever the legal ties between the children and their grandmother.
Leaving messages with foster parents does not qualify as “communicating with a child” under TPR statute
Dane County DHS v. Hershula B., 2014AP2076, 2/26/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket
Hershula appealed an order terminating her parental rights. She argued that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the abandonment issue because she presented evidence that she had communicated indirectly with her child. The court of appeals held that the phrase “communicate with the child” requires that the child share in the action of communicating with the parent. Slip op. ¶22. Indirect communications don’t count.
Parent’s request to revisit TPR order wasn’t supported by new evidence
State v. Tamara B., 2014AP1714, District 1, 2/10/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Tamara requested a new dispositional hearing in the case that terminated her parental rights to her daughter Tamijah, saying there was new evidence that affected the advisability of the termination order. The circuit court properly determined that the evidence she presented wasn’t new.
Termination of dominatrix’s parental rights upheld despite jury instruction error
State . Michelle M., 2014ap1539, District 1; 1/27/15 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
In this TPR case, a circuit court instructed a jury using the version of WIS JI-Children 346 that allows consideration of whether a mother has exposed her child to a hazardous living environment. The court should have given the prior version, which did not mention this consideration. According to the court of appeals, the jury could consider the point whether the instruction explicitly mentioned it or not.
TPR dismissed because final placement order lacked notice of conditions for return and grounds for termination
St. Croix County DHHS v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2014AP2431, District 3, 1/16/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 4/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 35; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the notice requirements of §§ 48.415(2)(a)1. and 48.356(2) were not satisfied because the last order concerning out-of-home placement of Juanita’s child did not include the written notice of the applicable grounds for termination or the conditions for Matthew’s return. The County therefore failed to meet its burden of proof on the continuing CHIPS ground under § 48.415(2)(a)1. and the termination order is vacated and the TPR petition dismissed.
Conditions for child’s return were sufficiently narrow to satisfy due process
State v. Kiwana L., 2014AP2306, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Kiwana L.’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the conditions set by the circuit court for return of her daughter Jasmine because those conditions were narrowly tailored to address her mental health issues; thus, the termination of her parental rights based on continuing CHIPS grounds under § 48.415(2) was proper.
Court of appeals reverses “unfitness” finding in TPR case
Winnebago County DHS v. Ashley A.O., 2014AP2404, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
A circuit court may not enter a summary judgment finding a parent unfit during the grounds phases of a TPR proceeding when that finding is based on an order denying the parent physical placement due to his (or her) incarceration.
Sec. 805.01(3) now governs requests to withdraw jury demands in TPR proceedings
Racine County HSD v . Latasia D.M., 2014AP1672/1673, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The stand out in this multi-issue TPR case is whether the circuit court erred in denying Latasia’s permission to withdraw her jury demand. The court of appeals answered “no” because even though § 48.31(2) and §48.422(4) set forth the procedures for demanding a jury in a TPR case, the general civil procedure statute, § 805.01(3), governs the withdrawal of a jury demand. The latter statute requires the consent of all the parties, which Latasia did not have.
Evidence found sufficient to support termination of parental rights
State v. Faizel K., 2014AP2035 & 2014AP2036, District 1, 12/2/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP2035; 2014AP2036
In this fact-intensive decision, the court of appeals holds there was sufficient evidence to support the orders terminating Faizel’s parental rights to his sons Mohammed K. and Robeul K.
A child is “adjudged” CHIPS for purposes of § 48.415(10) when CHIPS grounds are found
Dane County DHS v. Christina L., 2014AP1437, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was a factual basis for Christina L.’s no contest plea to grounds for termination under § 48.415(10) because the child in this case, Aiden G-L., was “adjudged” CHIPS within three years of the involuntary termination of her parental rights to another child, Shaun L.