On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Dwayne F., Jr., 2014AP595, District 1, 6/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the best interests of Dwayne F.’s daughter would be served by a guardianship with the Child Welfare Bureau for adoption by her foster family, instead of placement with Dwayne F.’s father.

Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46

Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.

Mareza L. v. Kim M.P., 2013AP1382, District 1, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The plain language of § 48.46(2) limits the time for any motion to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights, regardless of the grounds for the motion. Thus, even though Mareza now claims her voluntary termination was not, in fact, voluntary, her failure to bring a motion to reopen the judgment within the statute’s time limits means the circuit court properly denied the motion.

Barron County DHHS v. Maria A., 2013AP2735, District 3, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under the highly deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims, State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶30, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Maria failed to assume parental responsibility for her daughter,

Mary E.B. v. Cecil M., 2014AP160, District 2, 3/26/14; court  of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted, 9/18/14, appeal voluntarily dismissed 12/17/14; case activity

The circuit court properly found that a mother who petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights did not prove the father failed to assume parental responsibility, § 48.415(6). The court of appeals rejects the mother’s arguments that the circuit court applied an erroneous legal standard and that its decision is not supported by the record.

State v. Delano W., 2013AP2445 & 2013AP2446, District 1, 3/14/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2445; 2013AP2446

The trial court did not violate Delano’s due process rights and properly exercised its discretion when it prohibited Delano from visitation with his children pending the trial on a petition to terminate his parental rights to those children.

Under § 48.42(1m),

Wood County Human Services Dep’t v. Melanie M., 2013AP2814, 2013AP2815, & 2013AP2816, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2814; 2013AP2815; 2013AP2816

Foster parent testimony during the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding has the potential to be prejudicial because it creates a risk the jury will reach a verdict by comparing the biological parent to the foster parent;

Dane County DHS v. Nancy M., 2013AP1886 & 2013AP1887, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1886; 2013AP1887

During the first day of a fact-finding hearing to the court to determine whether there were grounds to terminate Nancy’s parental rights, the trial court admitted evidence about Nancy’s bonding with her two children. Nancy objected, and the County and GAL agreed the line of questioning was not relevant to the grounds phase of the TPR proceeding,

Aaron W.M. v. Britany T.H., 2013AP2123, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Britany claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to: 1) hearsay testimony from the child’s father that related incidents of Britany’s bad parenting;  and 2) the petitioner’s “golden rule” rule argument during closing, which asked the jurors to view the case as if the child were their own, thus improperly asking the jurors to “internalize and personalize the case,

State v. Shymika S.W., 2013AP2415, District 1, 2/4/14  (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

Issue:  Whether, in terminating Shymika S.W.’s parental rights to her daughter, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ignoring § 48.426(3)’s “adoptability factors?”  Those factors are found in § 48.426(3)(a) and (f), and they require consideration of the likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination and whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of termination,