On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Jimmy J., 2014AP573, District 1, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel had a reasonable strategic reason for not objecting to court’s instructing TPR jury that while agreement of 10 or more jurors was necessary as to each verdict question, the same 10 jurors should agree on all the answers.

Portage County DHHS v. Julie G., 2014AP1057, District 4, 7/31/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows Julie received the warnings required under § 48.356 even though the relevant notice form did not have her signature. In addition, Julie’s substantive due process rights were not violated because the conditions for return of her child imposed by the continuing CHIPS order were not impossible for her to meet despite her incarceration.

Manitowoc County Human Services Dep’t v.  Ralph B., 2014AP140, District 2, 7/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision to terminate Ralph B.’s parental rights because Manitowoc County met its burden of proving a failure to assume parental responsibility and because trial counsel had sound strategic reasons for not pursuing various lines of defense during the grounds phase of Ralph’s trial.

State v. Queentesta H., 2014AP761, District 1, 7/22/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not err in answering the first question of the special verdict forms submitted to the jury in Queentesta’s TPR trial because the jury could not have reached any other conclusion regarding those questions.

Green County DHS v. Ericka L.R., 2014AP1106, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Assuming the “fair and just reason” standard for plea withdrawal before sentencing also applies to motions to withdraw consent to TPR before disposition, Ericka failed to establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing her voluntary consent to termination of her rights to her daughter.

Dane County DHS v. Mable K., 2014AP398 & 2014AP399, District 4, 7/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP398; 2014AP399

Mable K. is not entitled to a new grounds trial based on two alleged evidentiary errors—the admission of evidence about her lack of contact with her children after the period of alleged abandonment, and the admission of evidence of specific instances of her prior untruthful conduct—because there was overwhelming evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.

State v. Rickey V., 2014AP334, District 1, 7/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Father’s failure to appear at two scheduled evidentiary hearings on whether there were grounds for termination of parental rights was sufficiently “egregious” to justify a default judgment against him under Dane County DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶70, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198 (circuit court may find a parent in default if the parent’s unintentional failure to follow court orders is “‘so extreme, substantial and persistent’ that the conduct may be considered egregious”).

State v. Connie P., 2013AP2854, District 1, July 1, 2014 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Connie’s no-contest plea at the grounds phase of her TPR proceeding was knowing and voluntary despite her post-termination assertion that she was unduly influenced by the trial court’s comments before the scheduled trial and by the decision of her child’s father, Ray, to stipulate to grounds for termination.

State v. Dwayne F., Jr., 2014AP595, District 1, 6/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the best interests of Dwayne F.’s daughter would be served by a guardianship with the Child Welfare Bureau for adoption by her foster family, instead of placement with Dwayne F.’s father.

Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46

Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.