On Point blog, page 42 of 59
All motions to reopen judgment based on voluntary termination of parental rights are governed by § 48.46(2)
Mareza L. v. Kim M.P., 2013AP1382, District 1, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The plain language of § 48.46(2) limits the time for any motion to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights, regardless of the grounds for the motion. Thus, even though Mareza now claims her voluntary termination was not, in fact, voluntary, her failure to bring a motion to reopen the judgment within the statute’s time limits means the circuit court properly denied the motion.
Evidence was sufficient to show mother failed to assume parental responsibility
Barron County DHHS v. Maria A., 2013AP2735, District 3, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under the highly deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims, State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶30, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Maria failed to assume parental responsibility for her daughter,
TPR petitioner didn’t prove that father failed to assume parental responsibility
Mary E.B. v. Cecil M., 2014AP160, District 2, 3/26/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted, 9/18/14, appeal voluntarily dismissed 12/17/14; case activity
The circuit court properly found that a mother who petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights did not prove the father failed to assume parental responsibility, § 48.415(6). The court of appeals rejects the mother’s arguments that the circuit court applied an erroneous legal standard and that its decision is not supported by the record.
Suspension of visitation while TPR was pending did not violate due process
State v. Delano W., 2013AP2445 & 2013AP2446, District 1, 3/14/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2445; 2013AP2446
The trial court did not violate Delano’s due process rights and properly exercised its discretion when it prohibited Delano from visitation with his children pending the trial on a petition to terminate his parental rights to those children.
Under § 48.42(1m),
Allowing testimony of foster parent at TPR grounds hearing was not improper
Wood County Human Services Dep’t v. Melanie M., 2013AP2814, 2013AP2815, & 2013AP2816, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2814; 2013AP2815; 2013AP2816
Foster parent testimony during the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding has the potential to be prejudicial because it creates a risk the jury will reach a verdict by comparing the biological parent to the foster parent;
Conditionally admitting evidence during TPR grounds hearing when evidence was relevant only to disposition was harmless error
Dane County DHS v. Nancy M., 2013AP1886 & 2013AP1887, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1886; 2013AP1887
During the first day of a fact-finding hearing to the court to determine whether there were grounds to terminate Nancy’s parental rights, the trial court admitted evidence about Nancy’s bonding with her two children. Nancy objected, and the County and GAL agreed the line of questioning was not relevant to the grounds phase of the TPR proceeding,
Trial counsel’s performance at TPR trial, if deficient, was not prejudicial
Aaron W.M. v. Britany T.H., 2013AP2123, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Britany claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to: 1) hearsay testimony from the child’s father that related incidents of Britany’s bad parenting; and 2) the petitioner’s “golden rule” rule argument during closing, which asked the jurors to view the case as if the child were their own, thus improperly asking the jurors to “internalize and personalize the case,
Court appropriately considered sec. 48.426 adoptability factors before ordering TPR
State v. Shymika S.W., 2013AP2415, District 1, 2/4/14 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity
Issue: Whether, in terminating Shymika S.W.’s parental rights to her daughter, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ignoring § 48.426(3)’s “adoptability factors?” Those factors are found in § 48.426(3)(a) and (f), and they require consideration of the likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination and whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of termination,
Parents in TPR proceeding not prejudiced by GAL’s connections to judge and prior representation of child at CHIPS hearing
Manitowoc County Human Services Dep’t v. Rebecca H, 2013AP421/422; 1/22/14; District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This is an appeal from an order terminating a couple’s parental rights to their daughter. They claimed their trial lawyer provided ineffective of assistance of counsel by failing to object to the admission of various types of evidence. The court of appeals quickly disposed of those errors through repeated findings that counsel’s performance was not deficient–which is one of the two requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel per A.S.
Termination of rights of cognitively disabled parent didn’t violate due process
State v. Lawanda R., 2013AP1661, District 1/4, 1/16/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly found that a parent with serious cognitive disabilities (she “functions at the level of a child less than ten years old” (¶8)) was unfit under § 48.415(2) on the sole basis that she failed to meet the conditions established by a continuing CHIPS order for the return of Will,