On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Delano W., 2013AP2445 & 2013AP2446, District 1, 3/14/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2445; 2013AP2446

The trial court did not violate Delano’s due process rights and properly exercised its discretion when it prohibited Delano from visitation with his children pending the trial on a petition to terminate his parental rights to those children.

Under § 48.42(1m),

Wood County Human Services Dep’t v. Melanie M., 2013AP2814, 2013AP2815, & 2013AP2816, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2814; 2013AP2815; 2013AP2816

Foster parent testimony during the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding has the potential to be prejudicial because it creates a risk the jury will reach a verdict by comparing the biological parent to the foster parent;

Dane County DHS v. Nancy M., 2013AP1886 & 2013AP1887, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1886; 2013AP1887

During the first day of a fact-finding hearing to the court to determine whether there were grounds to terminate Nancy’s parental rights, the trial court admitted evidence about Nancy’s bonding with her two children. Nancy objected, and the County and GAL agreed the line of questioning was not relevant to the grounds phase of the TPR proceeding,

Aaron W.M. v. Britany T.H., 2013AP2123, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Britany claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to: 1) hearsay testimony from the child’s father that related incidents of Britany’s bad parenting;  and 2) the petitioner’s “golden rule” rule argument during closing, which asked the jurors to view the case as if the child were their own, thus improperly asking the jurors to “internalize and personalize the case,

State v. Shymika S.W., 2013AP2415, District 1, 2/4/14  (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

Issue:  Whether, in terminating Shymika S.W.’s parental rights to her daughter, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ignoring § 48.426(3)’s “adoptability factors?”  Those factors are found in § 48.426(3)(a) and (f), and they require consideration of the likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination and whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of termination,

Manitowoc County Human Services Dep’t v. Rebecca H, 2013AP421/422; 1/22/14; District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from an order terminating a couple’s parental rights to their daughter.  They claimed their trial lawyer provided ineffective of assistance of counsel by failing to object to the admission of various types of evidence.  The court of appeals quickly disposed of those errors through repeated findings that counsel’s performance was not deficient–which is one of the two requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel per A.S.

State v. Lawanda R., 2013AP1661, District 1/4, 1/16/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly found that a parent with serious cognitive disabilities (she “functions at the level of a child less than ten years old” (¶8)) was unfit under § 48.415(2) on the sole basis that she failed to meet the conditions established by a continuing CHIPS order for the return of Will,

Barron County DH&HS v. Tara H., 2013AP2250, District 3, 12/27/13, unpublished; case activity

This is Tara H.’s 2nd trip to the court of appeals regarding this TPR.  The first time she won a new dispositional hearing.  At the start of that 2nd dispositional hearing, Tara’s counsel asked the trial court about the relevant time period for determining whether termination of her parental rights was in her son’s best interests. 

Jessica G. and Joshua G. v. Alicia L., 2013AP1843, District 2, 11/27/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Issue: Whether Alicia’s L’s consent to the termination of her parental rights was voluntary.

¶6 The circuit court may accept a parent’s voluntary consent to TPR only after questioning the parent and determining that the consent is voluntary and informed. Wis. Stat. § 48.41(2)(a). In making its determination,

Winnebago County DHS v. Christina M.C., 2013AP1519/1520; District 2; 11/27/13 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

In the initial “grounds” stage of this TPR, the County and the GAL made several veiled references, plus one explicit reference, to the “bests of the child,” a topic that’s not to be addressed until stage 2.  Christina moved to set aside the finding that she is unfit as a parent, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these comments.