On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

Issue/Holding: ¶13 n. 3:

The circuit court did not order a default under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5). Shirley E. had “appeared” at the hearing by her attorney. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis.  2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.The circuit court found Shirley E.

Kenosha Co. DHS v. Jodi W. 2006 WI 93, reversing summary order

Issue: Whether finding of parental unfitness in a TPR, grounded on a condition for the child’s return that was impossible to meet when imposed (namely that the parent set up a suitable residence within 12 months even though she was incarcerated and would not be released before then), violates substantive due process.

Holding:

¶49      Like the Nevada Supreme Court,

Kenosha Co. DHS v. Jodi W. 2006 WI 93, reversing summary order

Issue/Holding: The circuit court must undertake a colloquy with the parent tracking § 48.422(7); the parent must know the rights being waived; and on a challenge to the plea the parent must make a prima facie showing that the colloquy was defective and also allege a lack of understanding of the omitted information, ¶¶25-26,

Dane County DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, PFR filed 5/15/06

Issue/Holding: Holding the dispositional hearing beyond the 45-day time limit set by § 48.424(4) did not deprive the trial court of competency to proceed, where good cause existed for continuance under § 48.315(2), namely that the respondent’s attorney was going to be out of town during a portion of the limitation period, and the trial court expressly found good cause to schedule the hearing after counsel’s return,

Dane County DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, PFR filed 5/15/06

Issue/Holding: Holding the dispositional hearing beyond the 45-day time limit set by § 48.424(4) did not deprive the trial court of competency to proceed, where good cause existed for continuance under § 48.315(2), namely that the respondent’s attorney was going to be out of town during a portion of the limitation period, and the trial court expressly found good cause to schedule the hearing after counsel’s return,

Dane County DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, PFR filed 5/15/06 (published)

Issue/Holding1: The same “self-representation competency standards developed in … criminal cases” applies to TPRs, ¶¶9-16.

Standards summarized, ¶¶17-23. Though much of this recitation is fairly abstract, the following embellishment of Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980) may be of interest, ¶20 n.

State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, affirming unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether a TPR court lost competency to proceed because the fact-finding hearing was held more than 45 days after the contested plea hearing, the time limit set by § 48.422(2).

Holding: A continuance of the fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-day limit may properly be granted under § 48.315(2), as to which good cause was established on this record,

Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the TPR respondent is likely to be able to meet the conditions for return of her children.

Holding:

¶40      In deciding the issue of foundation, the circuit court seemed fixated on the psychological tests that Dr.

State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264

Issue Whether the State sufficiently proved grounds to support TPR such that the court should change the jury’s special verdict to the contrary.

Holding: “Because the record contains contradictory evidence and a key witness did not testify, and because it is possible the jury did not believe that the State proved the six-month period of abandonment, the trial court’s refusal to change the verdict answer or to grant a new trial was not ‘clearly wrong,’” ¶1.

State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264

Issue/Holding:¶1 n. 4:

Lamont argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because the guardian ad litem filed the notice of appeal and the State simply joined in the appeal instead of the other way around. We reject Lamont’s contention.  WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.235(7) plainly states that the guardian ad litem “may appeal,