On Point: 40. TPRs

Dane County DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, PFR filed 5/15/06 (published)

Issue/Holding1: The same “self-representation competency standards developed in … criminal cases” applies to TPRs, ¶¶9-16.

Standards summarized, ¶¶17-23. Though much of this recitation is fairly abstract, the following embellishment of Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980) may be of interest, ¶20 n.

State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, affirming unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether a TPR court lost competency to proceed because the fact-finding hearing was held more than 45 days after the contested plea hearing, the time limit set by § 48.422(2).

Holding: A continuance of the fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-day limit may properly be granted under § 48.315(2), as to which good cause was established on this record,

Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the TPR respondent is likely to be able to meet the conditions for return of her children.

Holding:

¶40      In deciding the issue of foundation, the circuit court seemed fixated on the psychological tests that Dr.

State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264

Issue Whether the State sufficiently proved grounds to support TPR such that the court should change the jury’s special verdict to the contrary.

Holding: “Because the record contains contradictory evidence and a key witness did not testify, and because it is possible the jury did not believe that the State proved the six-month period of abandonment, the trial court’s refusal to change the verdict answer or to grant a new trial was not ‘clearly wrong,’” ¶1.

State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264

Issue/Holding:¶1 n. 4:

Lamont argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because the guardian ad litem filed the notice of appeal and the State simply joined in the appeal instead of the other way around. We reject Lamont’s contention.  WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.235(7) plainly states that the guardian ad litem “may appeal,

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266

Issue/Holding:

¶2        Birth-parents “have constitutionally protected rights to raise their children as they see fit, and these rights may only be circumscribed if the government proves that there is a ‘powerful countervailing interest.’” Richard D. v. Rebecca G., 228 Wis. 2d 658, 661, 599 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoted sources and one internal quotation mark omitted).

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266

Issue: Whether the right of a parent imprisoned  in the federal system to “meaningfully participate” in a TPR proceeding was violated when he was not physically produced in court but, instead, was limited to telephonic participation.

Holding: Where various mechanisms could have been utilized to produce the father yet weren’t attempted, and the telephone hook-up was, under the circumstances,

State v. James P., 2005 WI 80, affirming, 2004 WI App 124

Issue: Whether biological father’s parental rights could be terminated on the ground of “abandonment” where he was not adjudicated as father until after alleged periods of abandonment.

Holding:

¶15 We hold that an individual who is in fact the biological father of a nonmarital child satisfies the definition of “parent”

Sheboygan County DSS v. Rachel B., 2005 WI 84, reversing unpublished decision
IssueWhether competency challenge to a TPR proceeding is waived under § 48.422(2) if not first raised in circuit court.

Holding:

¶2        We conclude such a competency challenge based on the violation of the statutory time limitation of Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) cannot be waived, even though it was not raised in the circuit court. 

Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the TPR respondent is likely to be able to meet the conditions for return of her children.

Holding:

¶71      The State’s interest in terminating parental rights promptly does not outweigh the requirements of fundamental fairness and Shannon R.’s constitutionally protected due process right to be heard in a meaningful manner.