On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. I.A.A., 2023AP1723-24, 2/28/24, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Long story short, the court of appeals affirms the orders terminating I.A.A.’s (“Ivy’s”) parental rights despite the circuit court’s admitted failure to comply with Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3)’s mandate to take testimony related to grounds at Ivy’s no contest plea hearing. Because the court was able to “tease out” all the necessary elements to grounds from “other witnesses at other hearings,” the court concludes that Ivy was not prejudiced and that the error was harmless. Op., ¶33.

State v. S.N., 2023AP2366-67, 2/27/24, District I (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Sally’s” challenge to the court’s discretionary termination order fails, as the circuit court’s order was supported by evidence in the record.

State v. M.M., 2023AP2093-2100, 2/22/24, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Challenges to circuit court disposition orders are almost never successful. This case is no exception. M.M. (“Melissa”) argued that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it determined that terminating her parental rights to her eight children was in the best interests of the children. The court of appeals disagrees and affirms.

Kenosha County DC&FS v. R.M.F., 2023AP2156-157, 2/21/24, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Given the difficult standard for proving judicial bias, COA concludes that R.M.F. has failed to show that the court’s remarks to jurors are a basis for reversing this TPR.

Columbia County DH&HS v. S.A.J., 2023AP1884, 2/15/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a lengthy opinion notable for its treatise-like treatment of the issues, COA rejects S.A.J.’s challenges to her TPR order.

K.W. & D.W. v. S.L., 2023AP1582, 2/13/24, District 3 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The summary judgment issue here turned on one simple question: did a genuine issue of fact exist as to whether S.L. (“Susan”) knew or could have reasonably discovered the whereabouts of her son (Alex) during the relevant period of alleged abandonment? Upon consideration of Susan’s multiple affidavits and drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Susan, as the non-moving party, the court of appeals reverses the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment on grounds.

State v. E.M.A., 2023AP2043-45, 1/30/24, District 1 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

E.M.A.’s (“Emma’s) challenge to the court’s exercise of discretion at disposition fails and the court of appeals concludes the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in terminating Emma’s parental rights to her three children.

Sheboygan County DHHS v. J.L., 2023AP1884, 1/3/24, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In yet another appeal of the circuit court’s discretionary decision to terminate a parent’s rights, COA easily rejects J.L.’s invitation to reweigh the evidence.

State v. B.W., 2022AP1329, review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 12/11/23; affirmed 6/27/24 case activity (briefs not available)

We don’t know the precise issue or issues presented, but the court of appeals’ decision suggests the state supreme court may be looking to un-fracture the fractured decision it rendered last term in State v. A.G. There, the circuit court had told a parent pleading to grounds in his TPR trial’s first phase that the state would have the burden in the second phase: that is, the state would have to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the child’s best interest. Of the six justices who decided the case, four agreed there is no “burden”; rather the best-interest inquiry is the “polestar” (your guess is as good as ours on what sort of legal standard that encompasses). But these four could not agree on why the judge’s communication of this concededly incorrect standard didn’t mandate reversal; see our post for more on this.

R.G. v. J.J., 2023AP630, 1/9/24, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The father here–whom the court calls “Jacob”–appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, “Hank.” About a year and a half after Hank was born, Jacob went to prison for sexual assault of a different child. Around this time, Jacob and his ex-wife, “Rita,” stipulated in their divorce proceeding that Jacob would have no placement of Hank “until further order of the court.” About three and a half years later, Rita moved to terminate Jacob’s parental rights to Hank, alleging among other things that he’d been denied physical placement for more than a year under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4). Jacob principally argues his agreement to forego placement while he was incarcerated doesn’t constitute a “denial,” so the statutory ground doesn’t apply.