On Point blog, page 42 of 81

SCOTUS leaves dual-sovereignty doctrine intact

Terance Martez Gamble v. United States, USSC No. 17-646, 2019 WL 2493923, June 17, 2019, affirming United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Gamble challenged the validity of the “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, which holds that it doesn’t violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to convict a person in both state and federal court for the same crime. By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejects his challenge.

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COA: Virginia petition process doesn’t restore Wisconsin gun rights

James P. Moran v. Wisconsin Department of Justice, 2019 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)

James Moran was convicted of a felony in Virginia. That state has a procedure by which a person can petition to have his or her right to own a gun restored, and Moran’s petition was successful. So he can buy a gun there. Can he buy one here?

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SCOW will decide how multiple enhancers apply to OWI fines

State v. Charles L. Neill, IV, petition for review granted 6/11/19; 2018AP75; case activity (including briefs)

This is a review of a published court of appeals decision. Here’s the issue, as stated in our prior post:

Neill pleaded to an OWI-3rd, which has a minimum fine of $600. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3. His plea came with two statutory enhancers: the one for having a BAC over .25 (Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3.), and the one for having a child in a car (§ 346.65(2)(f)2.). The former quadruples the minimum fine, and the latter doubles it. So, what’s the minimum fine?

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Defense win! SCOW declares 971.14’s treatment to competency provisions unconstitutional

State v. Fitzgerald, 2018AP1296-CR, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19; case activity

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) held that a mentally ill  defendant has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted antipsychotic medication. The State can force it on him to restore his competency for trial only by proving the 4 “Sell factors.” Fitzgerald holds that §971.14 does not conform to Sell. Going forward, the State cannot obtain involuntary med orders based solely on §971.14 because it is constitutionally infirm.  The State must satisfy Sell factors. The cases where this is possible may be “rare.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  Involuntary medication to restore competency to proceed should be the exception, not the rule.

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SCOW splits 3-3 over how to trigger an automatic stay of an involuntary medication order pending appeal

State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Milw. County Circuit Court, 2018AP1214-W, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19, case activity

A defendant is entitled to an automatic stay of an involuntary medication pending appeal, otherwise his liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medications is rendered a nullity. State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, __Wis. 2d __, 912 N.W.2d 14. But what triggers the automatic stay–the entry of the involuntary medication order itself or the filing of the notice of appeal? SCOW split 3-3 on this issue (Abrahamson did not participate), so the court of appeals decision stands.

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SCOW to address whether solicitation of reckless conduct is a crime

State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2018AP651-CR, petition and cross petition for review of a published court of appeals decision, both granted 6/11/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

Is solicitation of first degree reckless injury a crime under Wisconsin law?

Is solicitation of first degree recklessly endangering safety a lesser included offense of first degree reckless injury, making conviction for both offenses multiplicitous in this case?

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SCOW okays default Chapter 51 recommitments without notice to the subject individual

Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019WI66, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2017AP1468; 6/12/19; case activity

This 4-3 decision is alarming. Waukesha County petitioned to recommit S.L.L., a homeless person, but failed to serve her with notice of the hearing because it had no idea where she was. Since she was not served, she didn’t appear for the hearing. The circuit court entered a default recommitment and forced medication order in her absence. SCOW says that is A-Okay.

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SCOW muddles confrontation, hearsay analysis; addresses Miranda at John Doe proceeding

State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, 6/5/19, affirming an unpublished decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Hanson was called to testify at a John Doe proceeding looking into an unsolved homicide. He was eventually charged with the crime, and at his trial the jury heard  a portion of Hanson’s John Doe testimony. The supreme court held the admission of this evidence didn’t violate Hanson’s right to confrontation. The court also holds that Hanson’s John Doe testimony was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because that warning isn’t required at a John Doe proceeding.

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COA reinforces Wisconsin’s elimination of 4th Amendment protections in traffic stops

State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2019 WI App 34, petition for review granted, 10/15/19, affirmed, 2020 WI 63; case activity (including links to briefs)

This is a published, split decision with a vigorous, showstopping “concurrence” by Reilly. Neubauer and Hagedorn hold that after writing Brown a ticket for a seatbelt violation, an officer’s request that he exit his car and consent to a search (where he was looking for drugs and weapons) was part of the traffic stop’s original mission.  Reilly “concurs” only because he can’t defy SCOW’s recent opinions in State v. Floyd and State v. Wright, which he regards as intellectually dishonest and akin to the Dred Scott decision.

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SCOW: Courts taking guilty pleas needn’t cover each constitutional right being waived

State v. Javien Cajujuan Pegeese, 2019 WI 60, 5/31/19, review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Pegeese pleaded guilty to a robbery and received probation. He later sought plea withdrawal, asserting the circuit court’s colloquy had been deficient because it didn’t inform him of the constitutional rights he was waiving, and further alleging that he actually did not understand those rights–that is, he asserted a Bangert-type plea-withdrawal claim. The supreme court now holds the colloquy not deficient, because the court referred to the plea questionnaire form on which the rights were listed, asked Pegeese’s attorney whether he believed Pegeese understood the questionnaire, and asked Pegeese himself whether he understood “the Constitutional Rights you give up when you enter a plea” and confirmed that Pegeese had no questions about those rights.

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