On Point: Important Posts

J.C. v. R.S., 2022AP1215 , 2/16/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a rare Chapter 55 reversal, the court of appeals held that the petitioner failed to prove that the individual under review had a degenerative brain disorder that was likely to be permanent.

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification filed 2/8/23, certification granted, 3/24/23, remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?

State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)

Shirikian pleaded to OWI as a fifth offense. Back in 2019, the legislature amended the statutes to create a both a presumptive and a mandatory minimum sentence for OWI 5th and OWI 6th. See 2019 Wis. Act 106; Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5. The presumptive minimum requires at least 18 months of initial confinement, but the statute lets a court go lower if it finds doing so in the best interest of the community and not harmful to the public. The court of appeals now holds that even if a court decides to give less than 18 months IC, it’s still obligated to impose a bifurcated sentence. Since bifurcated sentences necessarily involve at least a year of IC, see Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b), that year is the true mandatory minimum. Further, the court holds, a sentencing judge can’t avoid this minimum by imposing and staying a prison sentence and ordering of probation. Because the judge here did order probation, the court of appeals remands with directions that the lower court impose a legal sentence.

State v. Ayodeji J. Aderemi, 2023 WI App 8; case activity (including briefs)

This appeal concerns a problem many will encounter. An alleged attempt to e-file a document apparently failed. Here, the document was the State’s Information. Aderemi argued that the fumble caused the State to miss its filing deadline, so under §971.01(2) the circuit court had to dismiss the case without prejudice. In a split decision, recommended for publication, the majority (White and Brash) ruled for the State. The dissenter (Dugan) faults the majority for ignoring important parts of Wisconsin’s e-filing statute. He would reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

State v. James P. Killian, 2020AP2012, review of a published court of appeals decision granted 1/20/23; case activity

Issues presented (from state’s PFR):

Has the State exposed Killian to multiple prosecutions for the same offense in violation of double-jeopardy principles?

On January 25, 2023, the court of appeals ordered the publication of the following criminal-law related decision:

State v. Steven W. Bowers, 2023 WI App 4 (affirming suppression of evidence seized during warrantless search of defendant’s Dropbox account)

Counterman v. Colorado, USSC No. 22-138; cert. granted 1/13/23; reversed 6/27/23 Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

Question presented:

Whether, to establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective “reasonable person” would regard the statement as a threat of violence.

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. renders deportable noncitizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies after they admitted to the U.S.. Under the I.N.A., “an offense relating to the obstruction of justice” where the term of imprisonment is at least one year qualifies as an aggravated felony whether it is committed in violation of state or federal law.  In Pugin v. Garland, Case No. 22-23,

State v. Jeffrey L. Hineman, 2023 WI 1, 1/10/23, reversing a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2020AP226, case activity (including briefs)

At Hineman’s trial for sexual assault of a child, a police officer testified that she believed the child had accused Hineman of touching him several months before her investigation began, and several months before the child made similar statements in a forensic interview. This wasn’t true, and the officer’s police report contradicted her testimony on this point: it said a CPS report had noted no allegations of abuse. But when defense counsel attempted to impeach the officer with her own report, the officer testified that she “didn’t know if” she’d “documented” the alleged prior consistent accusation, and while she “would think [she] would have” written such information in the report, she “might not have.”  It would have been easy to prove conclusively that there was no such allegation: counsel just needed the CPS report. But she didn’t have it, because the state–in what it concedes was a violation of its Brady obligations–didn’t turn it over. SCOW now says “eh, who cares?” and reverses the court of appeals’ grant of a new trial.

There’s an interesting petition for writ of certiorari on this issue pending in SCOTUS. As this post from the Confrontation Blog explains: “The question is whether, or in what circumstances, the testimony of a prosecution witness at a preliminary hearing may be used at trial if the witness is then unavailable.  This is an issue on which the Supreme Court has not given any guidance since Crawford, and the petition ably shows that the lower courts are in clear dispute.”