On Point: Important Posts

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)

It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.

Jae Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, 2017 WL 2694701 (June 23, 2017), reversing Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lee’s lawyer told him he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty to a drug charge. His lawyer was wrong, so he performed deficiently under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). But can Lee establish his lawyer’s indisputably wrong advice prejudiced him, i.e., that he would have gone to trial had he known he would be deported even though he had no real prospect of acquittal? Yes, says a majority of the Supreme Court, rejecting the approach urged by the Government and adopted by some federal circuits.

Weaver v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 16-240, 2017 WL 2674153 (June 22, 2017); affirming Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495 (Mass. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Members of the public–specifically, Kentel Weaver’s family–were excluded from the overcrowded courtroom during jury selection for his trial. Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial have been called structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis. But Weaver’s lawyer didn’t object, so this is an ineffective assistance claim, which of course requires him to show prejudice. But how do you show that you were prejudiced by a structural error–after all, the term refers to an error whose “effect … cannot be ascertained”? United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).

State v. Keimonte Antoine Wilson, Sr., 2017 WI 63, 6/22/17, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds that the provisions of § 885.03 govern service of a subpoenas in criminal cases, not the provisions of § 805.07.

State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?

State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, petition for review granted 10/17/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 52; case activity (including briefs)

Muldrow tried to withdraw his plea to sexual assault charges because the circuit court did not advise him during the plea colloquy that his pleas would subject him to lifetime GPS monitoring under § 301.48. The court of appeals holds that lifetime GPS monitoring isn’t “punishment” and therefore the court wasn’t required to advise Muldrow that he’d be subject to the requirement as a consequence of his pleas.

Packingham v. North Carolina, USSC No. 15-1194, 2017 WL 2621313 (June 19, 2017); reversing State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lester Packingham was convicted for having sex with a 13 year old when he was 21, and was thus required to register as a sex offender for 30 years or more. Eight years later, having completed his sentence, Packingham posted on Facebook to celebrate the dismissal of a traffic ticket. He was charged with, and eventually pled to, a felony under a North Carolina law that prohibits those on the registry from accessing “a commercial social networking Web site” if they know the site allows children to sign up.

Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittman, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-3397, 2017 WL 2683893, 6/22/17, affirming Dassey v. Pittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016).

Over a dissent, the Seventh Circuit holds that the Wisconsin court of appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they decided that Brendan Dassey voluntarily confessed to being involved with Steven Avery in the murder of Teresa Halbach.

Charles Turner, et al., v. United States, USSC Nos. 15-1503 & 15-1504, 2017 WL 2674152 (June 22, 2017), affirming Turner v. U.S., 116 A.3d 894 (D.C. App. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In granting cert in this case the Court told the parties to brief one issue: Whether the convictions of the petitioners must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We thought the case might be the occasion for the Court to say something important about Brady, but that didn’t happen. The Court simply says the issue before it “is legally simple but factually complex” (slip op. at 11), applies the Brady standard without alteration or elaboration, and concludes the convictions stand.