On Point blog, page 66 of 81
Defense win: State’s failure to disclose exculpatory Brady evidence warrants new trial
State v. Frank V. Blonda, 2015AP2431-CR, 4/11/17, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).
M.L., the victim in this case, called her sister, Vincenza, and allegedly told her that Blonda had hit her in the head with a telephone. Vicenza reported this to the police. Later, M.L. told the DA’s victim advocate that she did not want to press charges, Blonda did not hit her with the phone, and she had been drinking and wasn’t sure how she had been injured. She also filed a victim impact statement, which said that her injury was due to an accident that happened in Blonda’s absence. Unfortunately, the State didn’t disclose these statements to Blonda until the first and second days of his trial.
State v. Michael L. Washington, 2016AP238-CR, petition for review granted 4/10/17
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether a defendant may, by voluntary absence or other conduct, waive the statutory right to be present at trial before the trial has begun?
State v. Anton R. Dorsey, 2015AP648-CR, petition for review granted 4/10/2017
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point based on the petition for review and the state’s response to petition for review)
Is the “greater latitude” rule created by case law regarding admission of other acts evidence in child sex cases codified by § 904.04(2)(b)1., which applies to admission of other acts evidence in cases involving an array of crimes in addition to child sex offenses?
Is evidence of a defendant’s criminal acts committed against a person other than the victim admissible under § 904.04(2)(b)1. to show a generalized motive or purpose by a defendant to “control” a person with whom he is in a relationship?
SCOW boasts of “generous buffer zone” around 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination
State v. Brian Harris, 2017 WI 31, 4/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)
“This freedom from compelled self-incrimination is one of the nation’s ‘most cherished principles.’ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. We are sufficiently solicitous of this protection that we guard it by patrolling a generous buffer zone around the central prohibition.” Majority Op. ¶12. That’s the principle in theory. Here’s how it applies in practice.
SCOW: No right to confront witnesses at suppression hearings
State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, 4/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant whose guilt or innocence is at stake at trial may employ the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ …. But the Sixth Amendment does not mandate that statements considered at a suppression hearing face the crucible of cross-examination. Nor does the Due Process Clause demand this. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by relying on an audio recording of a deceased officer’s statement at the suppression hearing.” (¶31).
SCOW rebuffs 7th Circuit, reaffirms Wisconsin’s test for juror bias
State v. Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, 3/31/17, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)
This appeal primarily concerns whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) object to the seating of biased jurors, and (b) ensure that the trial court properly administered the oath to the venire panel in Lepsch’s presence. SCOW holds that none of Lepsch’s jurors were biased, and the venire panel was properly sworn. Thus, no ineffective assistance of counsel occurred. Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence acknowledges Wisconsin law governing juror bias appears inconsistent both internally and with federal case law and strives to harmonize it for the bench and the bar.
Defense win on newly-discovered Denny evidence affirmed on appeal
State v. Daniel G. Scheidell, 2015AP1598-CR, 3/29/17, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Congrats to the Remington Center for a winning a new trial in the interests of justice based on newly-discovered, 3rd-party perpetrator evidence 19 years after Scheidell was convicted of 1st degree sexual assault and armed robbery. Even better, their win was affirmed on appeal!
SCOW: 3-3 split marks change in tie-vote procedure, lost opportunity on Daubert
Ten weeks ago SCOW issued Seifert v. Balink, its first decision interpreting and applying §907.02, the Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony. The court split 2-1-2-2 (as in Abrahamson/AW Bradley–Ziegler–Gableman/Roggensack–Kelly/RG Bradley). That generated two On Point posts here and here, an Inside Track article here and a Wisconsin Lawyer article here. Today SCOW split 3-3 in Smith v. Kleynerman, which raised two issues regarding the law governing LLCs and a Daubert issue. Click here to see Kleynerman’s brief.
State v. Brian Grandberry, 2016AP173-CR, petition for review granted 3/13/2017
Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; affirmed 4/10/18, case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
- Whether the safe transport statute, which permits transporting a handgun in a vehicle, forecloses convicting a non-permit-holder under the concealed carry law for having a handgun in his vehicle.
- Whether the safe transport statute’s apparent contradiction of the concealed carry statute renders the law unconstitutionally vague.
Adult court had jurisdiction, competency to adjudicate offenses committed before defendant was age 10
State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 2017 WI App 22, petition for review granted 6/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 51; case activity (including briefs)
When Sanders was 19 years old he was charged with committing repeated sexual assaults of H.S. during a time period when he was aged 9 to 12 and H.S. was aged 7 to 9. He asserts the circuit court had neither subject matter jurisdiction nor competency to proceed on those charges because under §§ 938.02(3m), 938.12(1), and 938.183(1)(am) persons who commit criminal acts when they are under the age of 10 are not subject to the juvenile justice code or the criminal code. The court of appeals rejects the claim.