On Point blog, page 79 of 81
SCOTUS: Pretrial seizure of untainted assets violates right to counsel of choice
Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, 2016 WL 1228690 (March 30, 2016), vacating and remanding U.S. v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
The question presented in this case is whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets—that is, assets not traceable to a criminal offense—needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court answers “yes,” though for different reasons.
Court of Appeals clarifies standards for postconviction DNA testing
State v. Jeffrey C. Denny, 2016 WI App 27, petition for review granted 6/15/16, overruled, 2017 WI 17; case activity (including briefs)
If you are thinking about filing a motion under § 974.07 or are in the middle of litigating such a motion, you’ll want to read this decision. The court of appeals holds Denny is entitled to DNA testing of certain evidence because he showed that the items he sought to test are “relevant to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in [his] conviction….” The court also holds he is entitled to testing at public expense because it is reasonably probable he would not have been convicted if exculpatory DNA testing results had been available at the time of his conviction.
Carburetor cleaner is an “intoxicant” under prior version of OWI statute
State v. John Steven Duewell, 2015AP43-44-CR, 3/23/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a decision that seems to conflict directly with State v. Torbeck, 2012 WI App 106, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 N.W.2d 414, see our post here, the court of appeals holds that carburetor cleaner is an intoxicant under Wisconsin’s OWI statute, Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a)(2011-2012).
TPR order upheld despite multiple trial errors
Racine County Human Services Dep’t v. L.H., 2015AP1872, 3/23/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
During the fact-finding stage of L.H.’s TPR trial, counsel (1) failed to object to evidence that L.H’.s child, C.M., had bonded with his foster parents; (2) failed to object to an inaccurate 5/6ths verdict instruction; and (3) and agreed to only 3 peremptory strikes though L.H. was entitled to 4. The court of appeals nevertheless upheld the order terminating L.H.’s parental rights.
SCOTUS: 2nd Amendment extends to stun guns
Jaime Caetano v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 14-10078, 2016WL1078932 (per curiam), vacating Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 26 N.E.2d 688 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Jaime Caetano obtained a stun gun in order to protect herself from an abusive boyfriend. When she was prosecuted for violating a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the possession of stun guns, she argued that the law violated her 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against her. SCOTUS, in one fell swoop, granted her cert petition and reversed. Here is the meat of its two-page per curiam opinion:
SCOW: No breach in recommending consecutive sentences
State v. Patrick K. Tourville, 2016 WI 17, 3/15/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Patrick Tourville pled to four crimes in a deal that called on the state to recommend a sentence no higher than the one recommended by the PSI. The PSI recommended a prison term for each count; the state recommended that these terms be run consecutively. So when the state asked for consecutive time even though the PSI didn’t, did it honor its commitment to follow the PSI? If you answered “no,” the one thing we know about you is that you’re not a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Domestic abuse repeater enhancer applies only if state proves or defendant admits prior convictions
State v. Gavin S. Hill, 2016 WI App 29; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals holds that the standards for alleging and applying the ordinary repeater enhancer under § 939.62 also govern the domestic abuse repeater enhancer under § 939.621. Thus, the state must either prove that the defendant was convicted of the required predicate offenses or the defendant must admit that he was convicted of those offenses.
SCOW: Natural dissipation of heroin justifies skipping warrant for blood draw
State v. Andy J. Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 2/24/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Police found Andy Parisi unconscious and having trouble breathing. Almost two and a half hours later, at a hospital, an officer had his blood drawn to test for heroin. The state supreme court now holds that the circumstances of this case–which seem to boil down to the fact that heroin naturally dissipates within the bloodstream–were “exigent,” justifying the warrantless search.
State v. Stanley J. Maday, Jr., 2015AP366-CR, petition for review granted 2/11/16
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (copied from the State’s petition for review):
No witness, expert or otherwise, may give an opinion at a trial that another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the truth. Here, the social worker who interviewed a child regarding her claim that she had been sexually assaulted testified that there was no indication that the child had been coached and no indication that the child was not being honest during the interview. Did the social worker’s testimony constitute a prohibited opinion that, during this interview, the child was telling the truth?
Court of Appeals asks supreme court to untangle expert confrontation cases
State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2015AP158; District 2, 2/10/2016, certification granted 4/7/16, conviction affirmed, 2017 WI 9, ; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Does it violate a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution for the State to introduce at trial a toxicology report identifying certain drugs in a deceased victim’s system and/or testimony of a medical examiner basing his/her cause-of-death opinion in part on the information set forth in such a report, if the author of the report does not testify and is not otherwise made available for examination by the defendant?