On Point: Uncategorized

State v. Mary Alice Gentry, 2012AP59-CR, District 4, 5/24/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Gentry: Chandra N. Harvey, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶6        A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides protections against unreasonable search and seizure.  State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶24, 274 Wis.

Dane Co. DHS v. Angela M. K., 2012AP579, District 4, 5/24/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Angela M.K.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

The court rejects Angela’s challenge to her termination-of-rights plea to grounds. She argued she didn’t fully understand the CHIPS element, namely  that “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet [conditions for children’s return] within the 9-month period following the fact-finding hearing,” § 48.415(2)(a)3.

State v. Michael E. Mings, 2011AP2467-CR, District 2, 3/28/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Mings: Daniel P. Fay, Erin Fay; case activity

¶12      Hallmark testified that he has completed many traffic stops in his three years as a police officer and that “most innocent public, motoring traffic, don’t usually pass … at that slow of speeds, especially when the lane is that wide and clear of traffic.”  Hallmark explained that the vehicle conducting the initial traffic stop had pulled into a driveway and that Hallmark’s vehicle was in the parking lane on Tenny Avenue. 

State v. Daniel M. Buesgens, No. 2011AP2241-CR, District 3, 3/27/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Buesgens: Eric John Nelson; case activity

Buesgens, told he was “absolutely free to go” after a concededly proper traffic stop, wasn’t then “reseized” when the officer asked questions related to whether he had been drinking.

¶15      Similar to Williams, a reasonable person in Buesgens’ position would have felt free to decline Mork’s questions and terminate the encounter.  

State v. Elizabeth C. Emmenegger, 2011AP1214-CR, District 4, 3/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Emmenegger: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Sufficient cause for traffic stop upheld, citing State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.

¶17      While any one of these facts, standing alone, might be insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion,

County of Sheboygan v. Kenneth E. Mauser, 2011AP2153, District 2, 2/29/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Mauser: Chad A. Lanning; case activity

Failure to dim high-beam headlights, along with weaving within and outside the traffic lane, provided grounds for a traffic stop.

¶10      The circuit court properly looked to the totality of the circumstances and found the stop reasonable.  The circuit court did not rely exclusively on either the high-beam headlight use or the weaving;

State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, petition for review granted 10/15/13; case activity

Police lacked probable cause to stop Brown for a defective tail lamp, § 347.13, based on one unlit bulb (out of four) in the tail lamp assembly:

¶19 The parties agree with the circuit court’s finding that the police officers stopped the vehicle because “the middle” rear tail light on the driver’s side of the vehicle was unlit.

State v. Heather M. Kolman, 2011AP1917-CR, District 4, 1/12/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kolman: John C. Orth; case activity

 Scope of a concededly proper traffic stop (for defective brake light) wasn’t unlawfully expanded by testing Kolman for signs of intoxication (reciting alphabet; “mini” HGN test).

¶15      Most relevant here, and as discussed further below, a lawful seizure “becomes unreasonable when the incremental liberty intrusion resulting from the investigation supersedes the public interest served by the investigation.”  Arias,

State v. Nathaniel B. Kind, 2011AP1875-CR, District 4, 12/29/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kind: Ryan McNamara; case activity

A traffic stop for impaired driving supported by officer’s observation that Kind’s vehicle crossed fog line twice, without explicable cause such as debris on road.

¶15      While any one of these facts, standing alone, might be insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, “such facts accumulate,

State v. Douglas J. Richer, 2011AP1197-CR, District 3, 12/20/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Richer: Matthew F. Anich, Tyler William Wickman; case activity

Richer wasn’t in custody (to a degree associated with formal arrest) so as to require Miranda warnings:

¶15      Here, Richer’s argument focuses only on the time period before Mathison placed him under arrest for operating while intoxicated. He lists several factors he contends show he was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda.