On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶43. The State maintains that the court of appeals erred in interpreting Sullivan. We agree. Sullivan does not state, as the decision of the court of appeals suggests, that in situations where the circuit court fails to set forth a detailed analysis for admitting or excluding other-acts evidence,

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶58. First, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded, as it did, that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing context. Other-acts evidence is permissible to show the context of the crime and to provide a complete explanation of the case. 

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:  

¶59. The other-acts evidence was permissible to show the victims’ state of mind, to corroborate information provided to the police, and to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses in light of their recantations. Such purposes have been held to be permissible purposes in Wisconsin. 

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶60. Next, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. When a defendant’s motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, we have held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. 

State v. Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, reversing, 2001 WI App 299
For Vanmanivong: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding:

¶33. With the benefit of these above-stated standards, we now move to the second issue: the application of the procedures in this case. The parties here agree, as do we, that it was error for the circuit court to rely upon an unsworn memo in determining whether the identities of the confidential informants should be disclosed.

State v. Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, reversing, 2001 WI App 299
For Vanmanivong: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding: The test for disclosing an informant’s identity under § 905.10(3)(b) is found in the concurrence to State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982):

¶24. We now reaffirm our holding in Dowe that the concurrence in Outlaw states the test to be applied in determining whether an informant’s identity must be disclosed.

Sampson v. Sampson, 2004 WI 57, reversing 2003 WI App 141, 265 Wis. 2d 803, 667 N.W.2d 831

Issue: “¶2 The question before this court is whether a lawyer’s voluntary production of documents in response to opposing counsel’s discovery request constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 905.11 when the lawyer does not recognize that the documents are subject to the attorney-client privilege and the documents are produced without the consent or knowledge of the client.”

Holding:

¶4 We agree with the circuit court.

State v. Robert C. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, reversing 2003 WI App 151, 266 Wis. 2d 274, 667 N.W.2d 867
For Deilke: Kelly J. McKnight

Issue: Whether a defendant’s successful challenge to a prior plea-bargain based conviction that is being used as an enhancer in a current proceeding amounts to a breach of that prior plea bargain so as to allow reinstatement of charges dismissed under it.

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565; habeas denied, Samuel v. Frank, 525 F. 3d 566 (7th Cir 2008)
For Samuel: Robert A. Henak

Issue/Holding:

¶30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion,

State v. Jeffrey J. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, overruling State v. Jeffrey J. Meeks,
For Meeks: Christopher T. Van Wagner

Issue: Whether the trial court, in ruling on competency, improperly relied on its perceptions of the defendant’s attorney in a prior case, in stressing that that attorney hadn’t raised competency.

Holding:

¶1     …