On Point blog, page 13 of 133
SCOW holds imprisonment isn’t necessarily Miranda custody
State v. Brian L. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2018AP858CR; case activity (including briefs)
Halverson was interrogated over the phone by a police officer while he was in jail on an unrelated matter. Wisconsin courts once treated incarceration as per se Miranda custody, believing that was the law SCOTUS had established. But Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012), held that it’s not. Halverson argued the Wisconsin Supreme Court should adopt the per se rule under our state’s Constitution, but SCOW now declines. It also holds that the particular circumstances here didn’t amount to custody in the absence of such a rule.
SCOW holds video of child admissible; talks about forfeiture but makes no law
State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, 1/20/21, reversing a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Mercado stood trial for sexual assault of three young girls. A video of each girl’s forensic interview was played for the jury pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 908.08. Mercado contends that none of the videos were properly admitted. The supreme court holds that he forfeited most of his challenges, and rejects those it considers.
SCOW will review rape shield law’s exclusion of victim’s lack of sexual conduct
State v. Ryan Hugh Mulhern, 2019AP1565-CR, petition to review granted 1/20/21; reversed 6/21/22; case activity (including PFR and briefs)
Issue presented (from the state’s PFR)
Does § 972.11(2)(b), the “rape shield” statute, bar relevant evidence of the complainant’s lack of sexual conduct when the state offers the evidence to corroborate the complainant’s allegation of sexual assault and the evidence is not prejudicial to the complainant or the defendant and causes none of the harms the rape shield law is intended to protect against?
SCOW to address admissibility of un-Mirandized statements
State v. Manuel Garcia, 2018AP2319-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issue for review: (adapted from the State’s PFR and the COA’s opinion):
Whether the State may invoke the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule during its case-in-chief and thereby use a defendant’s statement, taken in violation of Miranda, to rehabilitate one of its witnesses?
SCOW to review sentence credit for Wisconsin offenders doing time in other states
State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):
1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”
The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.
SCOW accepts case raising issue of using lawful gun ownership as an aggravating sentencing factor
State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2018AP1476-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity (including briefs)
Issue presented:
Did the sentencing court violate Dodson’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms by considering his status as a lawful gun owner an aggravating factor at sentencing?
SCOW rejects 2nd Amendment challenge to felon-in-possession statute
State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2012 WI 1, 1/7/21, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP594-CR; case activity (including briefs)
In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to pay child support. Twelve years later, police executed a search warrant at his home and found a firearm and ammunition under his mattress. He pled guilty to one count of felon in possession. On appeal, he argued that §941.29(2)(2013-2014), which barred him from possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional as applied to his case. The statute has no time limit and draws no distinction between serious or violent felonies versus less serious felonies like failure to pay child support. In a 5-2 decision SCOW upheld the statute.
SCOW clarifies Dinkins and ineffective assistance involving guilty pleas
State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, 12/23/20, reversing a court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs).
Savage, who was homeless, claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to advise him that he had a defense under State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787 before he pled guilty to violating the sex offender registry rule that he provide his address to the DOC. According to Savage and the court of appeals, Dinkins held that a homeless person is exempt from sex offender registration requirements. In a unanimous opinion, SCOW reverses, holds that Dinkins did not establish that broad exemption, and thus counsel did not perform deficiently.
SCOW to address Miranda custody during a Terry stop
State v. Brian v. Rotolo, 2019AP2061-CR, petition for review granted 12/28/20; case activity
Issue presented (adapted from the petition for review):
In State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552, SCOW held that the test for Fifth Amendment Miranda custody is whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” Does this test for determining Miranda custody also apply when police legally detain a suspect under Terry?
SCOW to address child pornography surcharge
State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity
- Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
- Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?