On Point blog, page 18 of 133
SCOW: waiver in any county means adult jurisdiction in every county
State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)
We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?
In case of first impression, SCOW upholds search pursuant to Act 79
State v. Roy S. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, 11/15/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Act 79 permits law enforcement to search a person on probation, parole or extended supervision based on reasonable suspicion (not probable cause) that the person, is is about to, or has committed a violation of a condition of his release. In its first decision on this law, SCOW holds 7-0 that the officer here had (a) knowledge of Anderson’s supervision status before conducting the search at issue, and (b) the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct the search.
SCOW to review erroneous exclusion of defense DNA evidence
State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):
1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?
2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?
SCOW will address confusion created by Starks
State ex rel. Milton Eugene Warren v. Michael Meisner, 2019AP567-W, petition for review granted 10/16/19; reversed and remanded 6/10/20; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point based on the petition for review)
Whether under State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, Warren’s § 974.06 postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by the lawyer appointed on direct appeal should be heard in the circuit court or the Court of Appeals.
SCOW to review extension of traffic stop case where Judge Reilly invoked Dred Scott
State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2019 WI App 34, petition for review granted 10/15/19; case activity (including links to briefs)
Issues (petition for review)
Whether police unlawfully extended a noncriminal traffic stop beyond its initial purpose?
Defense win! SCOW reverses courts of appeals’ dismissal of Chapter 51 appeal for mootness
Waukesha County v. J.K., 2018AP616-NM, 9/3/19 (unpublished order); case activity
The court of appeals can be pretty aggressive about dismissing Chapter 51 appeals for mootness. This time SCOW slapped its hand. J.K.’s lawyer filed a no-merit notice of appeal. Before appointed counsel could file a no-merit report, and before J.K. could respond to any such report, the court of appeals (D2) dismissed the appeal as moot because the commitment order at issue had expired and J.K. was under a new commitment order.
SCOW to address interrogations and equivocal/unequivocal assertions of Miranda rights
State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, petition for review granted 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
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Whether law enforcement’s “dialogue” with Green amounted to an “interrogation” that should have been preceded by a Miranda warning?
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Whether Green invoked her right to remain silent when law enforcement asked her if she would like to make a statement and she responded: “No. I don’t know nothing.”
SCOW to address mootness, the due process right interpreters, and other Chapter 51 issues
Waukesha County v. J.J.H., 2018AP168, petition for review granted 9/3/19, case activity
Issues:
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Whether the mootness doctrine should apply to an appeal from a commitment order?
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Whether the circuit court violated due process when it held a Chapter 51 probable cause hearing and ordered a 30-day commitment/temporary guardianship/protective placement under §51.67 without providing J.J.H., who is deaf, sign language interpreters?
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Whether the circuit court erred in entering a §51.67 conversion order (a) at the probable cause stage of a Chapter 51 commitment and (b) without making any of the statutorily-required findings for the order?
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What is the mechanism for appealing a §51.67 order?
SCOW will review whether time served on vacated sentence can go to valid one
State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity
We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?
SCOW to review whether judge “friending” a litigant on Facebook created the appearance of bias
Timothy W. Miller v. Angela L. Carroll, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 8/14/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (based on Carroll’s Petition for Review)
- Does a judge’s acceptance of one party’s Facebook “friend” request by itself overcome the presumption that a judge is fair, impartial, and capable of ignoring any biasing influences, given the absence of any allegation of subjective bias or of facts showing the judge treated the other party unfairly, and when there were no electronic social media (“ESM”) communications between the judge and the party regarding the merits of the case?
- Does the fact a party “liked” a judge’s Facebook posts unrelated to the pending litigation or commented on a Facebook post unrelated to the pending litigation constitute an ex parte communication between a party and a judge?