On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2017AP850-CR; certification granted 9/4/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the court of appeals’ certification):

1.  Whether the doctrine that provides for the forfeiture of the right to confrontation by wrongdoing applies at a homicide trial where the declarant is the homicide victim, but where the defendant killed the declarant to prevent him or her from testifying at a separate proceeding.

2.  Whether preventing the declarant from testifying must be the defendant’s primary purpose for the wrongful act that prevented the declarant from testifying in that separate proceeding.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2017AP1618-CR, state’s petition for review granted 9/4/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on the state’s petition for review )

1. Does a person have a fundamental liberty interest in participation in a treatment court funded by the state and county when he or she is charged with an offense involving violent conduct as defined in § 165.95(1)(a) (2015-16)?
2. Does § 165.95 (2015-16), the statute creating DOJ’s grant funding for treatment courts, violate procedural due process because it does not procedures for treatment courts to follow in expelling a participant?

United States v. Dennis Franklin & Shane Salm, 2018AP1346-CQ, certification granted 8/15/18; case activity

The Seventh Circuit certified the following question of law to the Wisconsin Supreme Court:

Whether the different location subsections of the Wisconsin burglary statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a)–(f), identify alternative elements of burglary, one of which a jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict, or whether they identify alternative means of committing burglary,

Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, petition for review of memorandum opinion granted 8/15/18; case activity

Issues (from court of appeals opinion):

Whether the circuit court has personal jurisdiction to recommit a person under Chapter 51 when the County concedes that it has been unable to serve her with the petition for recommitment?

Whether a circuit court has authority to enter a default judgment against the subject of a Chapter 51 petition for recommitment?

Whether “examining” physician reports recommending involuntary commitment and medication prepared physicians who never actually examined the subject are sufficient to support a Chapter 51 commitment?

SCOW recently rejected a challenge to Wisconsin’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages for victims of medical malpractice. See Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78.  If you are challenging the constitutionality of  a Wisconsin statute, you may want to take a careful look at this decision.  The justices appear to have split over the proper standard for judging the constitutionality of a statute.

State v. Christopher John Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 7/6/18, reversing a circuit court order on bypass of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin has recognized 2 grounds for applying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence–to deter police misconduct and to ensure judicial integrity.  State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶20, 33, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶¶3, 31 n.10, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. The majority opinion in this case clarifies that a judge’s failure to follow the law when issuing a warrant cannot serve as an independent basis for the exclusionary rule. 

State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)

This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 7/3/18, reversing in part and remanding an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds there were exigent circumstances that allowed police to draw blood from Dalton without a warrant after he refused to consent to a blood draw. But a majority of the court also holds that the sentencing judge erred by explicitly imposing a harsher sentence on Dalton because he refused to consent to the blood draw.

State v. Kyle Lee Monahan, 2018 WI 80, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2014AP2187, case activity (including briefs)

You wouldn’t know it from the opinions, but the parties here briefed (and WACDL filed an amicus brief on) a question of harmless error doctrine. When trying to decide whether a trial error is harmless, the court is to ask whether “the jury would have arrived at the same verdict had the error not occurred.” Monahan contended that since a jury, as finder of fact, is free to draw any reasonable inference from the evidence, the reviewing court must view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant–that is, not declare an error harmless unless there is no reasonable set of inferences that would lead the jury to acquit. He argued that the court of appeals had not done this–that it had instead taken a conviction-friendly view of the evidence, effectively substituting its own views for that of the hypothetical “reasonable jury.” In so doing, he said, the court of appeals had effectively turned the (ostensibly stringent) harmless error test to the (extremely forgiving) standard for sufficiency of the evidence.

State v. Andre L. Scott, 2018 WI 74, 6/20/18, reversing a circuit court order on bypass, case activity (including briefs).

Ruling 7-0 for the defendant, SCOW reversed a circuit court order requiring involuntary treatment to competency for postconviction proceedings because the circuit court failed to follow State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). It also established a process for appealing an order finding a defendant incompetent and requiring involuntary treatment to competency. And–very importantly–it held that lower courts must automatically stay involuntary medication orders pending appeal. Note that aspects of this decision apply to pre-trial and trial competency proceedings as well as postconviction competency proceedings.