On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Jeremiah J. Purtell, 2014 WI 101, 8/1/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

In a case that expands the power of probation agents to search probationers’ computers and similar digital devices, the supreme court holds that the search of Purtell’s computer by his probation agent was reasonable because: 1) the computer was contraband, as Purtell was prohibited from possessing it by the rules of his probation; and 2) the agent had reasonable grounds to believe the computer might contain other items the probationer was prohibited from possessing—in this case, communications with underage girls or unauthorized Myspace accounts.

State v. James R. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, 8/1/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

The court of appeals granted Hunt a new trial; the supreme court takes that new trial away. The supreme court’s decision does not develop any new law or address a novel issue of statewide concern—and that’s no surprise, for as described here, the state’s petition for review admitted the case didn’t meet the usual standards for review. Instead, the court applies well-developed rules governing harmless error and ineffective assistance of counsel to the fact-specific claims in this case. In the course of doing so, however, the court misunderstands, ignores, or inverts some fundamental tenets of appellate review and basic rules of evidence.

State v. Donyil Leeiton Anderson, 2014 WI 93, 7/30/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Without explaining its reasoning, the supreme court declares that while the consumption of prescription medication in accordance with a physician’s advice may give rise to an involuntary intoxication defense under § 939.42, it can never create a mental defect that would sustain an insanity defense under § 971.15. The court also holds that mixing prescription medication with any amount of alcohol precludes a defendant from using either defense.

State v. Carlos Cummings and State v. Adrean L. Smith, 2014 WI 88, 7/24/14, affirming per curiam court of appeals decisions in 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; concurrence/dissent by Justice Prosser (joined by Justice Bradley); dissent by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity for Cummings and Smith

These cases address whether two Mirandized suspects unequivocally invoked their respective rights to remain silent, or cut off questioning, during police interrogations.  Citing State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242 the majority held that both defendants seem to have meant something other than what they literally said.  Their attempts to cut off questioning were “equivocal” and thus their statements need not be suppressed.

State v. Bobby L. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

State v. Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; lead opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

In two decisions consisting of 8 separate opinions spread out across almost 200 pages, the supreme court is unable to muster a majority on the central issue presented: Whether cell phone location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in both cases a majority assumes without deciding that cell phone tracking is a search and then affirms the convictions, although on different grounds. If you’re looking only for the holdings, here they are: In Tate, a majority holds that the circuit court’s “order” that a cell phone service provide information about the cell phone location was reasonable because it met the requirements for a search warrant. In Subdiaz-Osorio, a majority holds that the warrantless acquisition of the cell phone location data was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. If you’re looking for more information, read on.

State v. Tramell Starks,  2013 WI 69, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity; reconsideration denied 7/24/14, concurring opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson

Taking a cue from Napolean Bonaparte, the Wisconsin Supreme Court just denied two, year-old reconsideration motions outlining many serious mistakes in the Starks majority opinion (written by Justice Gableman).  No, that statement is not just sour grapes.  The Attorney General also asked for reconsideration  along the same lines as the defense. The Chief Justice took the extraordinary step of attaching both motions to her concurrence.

State v. Andres Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; majority opinion by Justice Prosser, dissenting opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Oliver Wendell Holmes said “hard cases make bad law.”  This decision proves that simple cases can too.  If you thought winning a §974.06 postconviction motion or a § 971.08(2) motion for plea withdrawal due to the trial court’s failure to give deportation warnings was tough before, wait until you read this decision.

State v. Cortez Lorenzo Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

When a juvenile is charged with a crime that gives the criminal court exclusive original jurisdiction, § 970.032(1) expressly requires the judge conducting the preliminary hearing to find probable cause for the specific felony that gives the court jurisdiction. In this case the supreme court addresses what happens when the trial judge doesn’t follow the statute’s clear mandate. On Point asked Eileen Hirsch, an attorney with the SPD’s Madison Appellate Office and all-around juvenile law guru, to discuss the decision. Here’s her take:

State v. Jessica A. Nellessen, 2014 WI 84, 7/23/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Under the two-step procedure for determining whether a confidential informant’s identity should be disclosed, a court must first determine whether there is reason to believe that the informant “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.” If so, the court must determine (usually after an in camera examination of either affidavits or the informant) whether “there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony.” § 905.10(3)(b); State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 124-26, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982). In this case, the supreme court elaborates on what a defendant must show to satisfy the first step, concludes that the required showing is “a reasonable possibility, grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense” (¶2), and applies the test in a way that ultimately collapses the previous two-step procedure into a single step.

State v. Muhammad Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, 7/22/14, reversing a published court of appeals opinion; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

The supreme court holds the circuit court incorrectly concluded that evidence of prior sexual activity between Sarfraz and I.N., the complainant in his sexual assault prosecution, was not relevant to a material fact in the case, but correctly concluded that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the prejudice to the complainant. Thus, the evidence was properly excluded.