On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Nancy J. Pinno & State v. Travis J. Seaton, 2014 WI 74, 7/18/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and affirming the circuit court’s orders denying postconviction relief; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity: Pinno; Seaton

Deciding an issue left open by State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶34-38, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, the supreme court rejects the argument that the right to a public trial must be affirmatively and knowingly waived by the defendant. Instead, the court holds, “[a] defendant who fails to object to a judicial decision to close the courtroom forfeits the right to a public trial, so long as the defendant is aware that the judge excluded the public from the courtroom.” (¶7).

County of Grant v. Daniel A. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 7/18/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

“Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we conclude that a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave.” (¶3).

State v. Angelica Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority decision by Justice Roggensack; case activity

Nelson wanted to testify at her trial on child sexual assault charges, but after a colloquy with her about waiving her right to remain silent the trial judge wouldn’t let her because he concluded she was testifying against counsel’s advice and her testimony was “completely irrelevant” to the elements the State had to prove. (¶¶14-16). The supreme court assumes without deciding that the trial judge erred, but it follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment.

State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2014 WI 69, 7/16/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Another defense victory!  Police stopped  Brown’s car due to an alleged violation of §347.13(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.”  In a 4-3 decision, the majority holds that the police here misunderstood the statute, so the stop was illegal.  Furthermore, a stop based upon an officer’s mistake of law, is unlawful, and the results of the ensuing search must be suppressed. Justice Prosser, dissenting, predicts the majority’s interpretation will be “a bonanza for litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.” ¶79.

State v. Erick O. Magett, 2014 WI 67, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

The circuit court erred when it prevented Magett from testifying on the issue of mental disease or defect during the responsibility phase of his NGI trial because the court mistakenly believed that Magett was not a competent witness regarding his own mental condition and that he was required to present expert testimony on the issue. The circuit court also erred in dismissing Magett’s NGI defense without hearing any testimony during the responsiblity phase. However, a majority of the supreme court holds these errors are harmless, so Magett does not get a new hearing on the issue of mental responsibility.

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2014 WI 71, 7/16/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and reversing the circuit court’s dismissal order; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

A necessary predicate of a commitment under ch. 980 is a conviction for a sexually violent offense. This case raises an unusual issue regarding predicate convictions: Can the state continue to prosecute a ch. 980 proceeding if the predicate conviction that was alleged in the petition is vacated and dismissed after the petition is filed? The supreme court answers “yes,” holding that the sufficiency of a ch. 980 petition is to be assessed as of the time it is filed, and at the time the petition in this case was filed there was a valid conviction for the predicate offense.

State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

This opinion addresses § 346.65(2)(am)6. as it applied to OWI 7th, 8th, and 9th offenses committed between July 1, 2010, when the statute first took effect, and April 10, 2014, when it was amended by 2014 Wis. Act 224. During that time period, the statute provided that the offense was a Class G felony, and that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under [§] 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.” The supreme court concludes this language is ambiguous because it could be read either to require a court to impose a bifurcated sentence or, instead, to permit a court to order probation with or without imposition of a bifurcated sentence, but that the legislative history makes it clear the language requires courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum three-year period of initial confinement.

State v. Luis M. Rocha-Mayo, 2014 WI 57, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 7/11/14; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Why tackle thorny legal issues surrounding Wis. Stat. §343.303’s prohibition against the use of PBTs at OWI trials when you can decide the case on harmless error grounds?  In this case, the PBT was ordered and administered by ER staff, not law enforcement. SCOW gets to pick and choose its cases. So when it grants review, the parties, their lawyers, the lower courts, and the bar hope the court will decide the legal issues, not re-review the evidence presented to the jury.  This fractured decision deserves a close look in order to understand what has and has not been decided about the use of PBTs in OWI trials.

State v. William F. Bokenyi, 2014 WI 61, 7/11/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

In a decision that plows no new legal ground, a divided supreme court holds that a prosecutor’s remarks at sentencing did not breach the plea agreement, but were instead within the proper bounds of argument in support of a permitted recommendation for imprisonment. Because the prosecutor didn’t breach the plea agreement, the court doesn’t decide the primary issue presented for review: Whether the court should overrule State v. Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, ¶29, 274 Wis. 2d 784, 683 N.W.2d 522, which held that if defense counsel does not consult with the defendant when foregoing an objection to a breach of the plea agreement, counsel performs deficiently because that is “tantamount to entering a renegotiated plea agreement without [the defendant’s] knowledge or consent.”

State v. Jimothy A. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 7/11/14, review of an per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by C.J. Abrahamson; case activity

This is a very nice victory for the defense.  It clarifies the “prejudice” showing required for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  And it assures lower courts that, where trial counsel fails to call an eyewitness whose credibility can be challenged, it is still quite possible to show the prejudice required for a new trial.  After all, witness credibility is for the jury to decide.