On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Was Vogt seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer pulled up behind Vogt’s parked car, approached the car, rapped on the driver’s window, and directed Vogt to roll the window down?

Petitions for review aren’t available on the court’s website, so the issue statement is based on the brief filed in,

Petitions for Review.  SCOW plans to hold a petitions conference on Monday–a good thing since as of September 30th there were a whopping 331 petitions for review pending.  One was filed as far back as 2009 (2009AP1955), 10 were filed in consolidated cases back in 2010 (2009AP2266 et al.) and 8 were filed in 2012.  The rest landed in the clerk’s office during 2013.  Of those 331 petitions for review,

Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1. bar evidence of prior consensual sexual activity between a defendant and complainant in a case involving alleged forcible criminal conduct because the consensual conduct is not relevant to a material fact in the case?

Petitions for review are not electronically filed,

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sharon A. Riek, 2103 WI 81 (per curiam), affirming referee’s dismissal of disciplinary complaint; case activity

The supreme court holds that a prosecutor’s duty to disclose information to the defense under SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) does not impose a broader duty to disclose than the constitutional duty imposed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

State v. Richard Lavon Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

Witucki, a state crime lab analyst, testified that Richard Deadwiller’s DNA matched a DNA profile derived from semen found on vaginal and cervical swabs collected from two sexual assault victims. (¶¶2, 10). But Witucki did not derive the DNA profile from the semen.

 State v. Tramell Starks,  2013 WI 69, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity. Majority opinion by Justice Gableman, with a dissent by Justice Bradley and joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Crooks

On Point is pleased to present this guest post by Attorney Rob Henak, an expert on Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction motions and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

State v. Andrew M. Edler, 2013 WI 73, on certification of the court of appeals; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), allows police to reinitiate interrogation of a defendant who invoked his right to counsel if the defendant has been released from custody for at least 14 days. The Wisconsin Supreme Court now adopts the Shatzer rule,

State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2011AP394-CR; case activity; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; concurrences by Justice Crooks (joined by Chief Justice Abrahmason and Justice Bradley), Justice Ziegler, and separately by Chief Justice Abrahamson.

This decision is alarming.  During Alexander’s 1st-degree intentional homicide trial, concerns surfaced about whether, due to possible bias, 2 different jurors should continue serving on the case.  

Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, reversing unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

In an important case for lawyers handling ch. 51 cases, the supreme court concludes there was insufficient evidence to prove a person subject to a commitment order was incompetent to refuse medication. Along the way, the court provides a “detailed interpretation of the statutory language”

Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 2013 WI 68, on certification from court of appeals; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

Transfer of a person committed under ch. 51 to a more restrictive setting within an inpatient placement, or from outpatient to inpatient placement, is subject to § 51.35(1). The statute recognizes two different bases for transfer: reasonable medical or clinical judgment;