On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

on review of published decision; case activity

Issue (composed by on Point) 

Whether sentencing reliance on inaccurate information (here, misapprehension of mandatory minimum incarceration) is structural error.

Travis pleaded guilty to an offense that all concerned (defense, prosecution, sentencing court) wrongly thought carried a 5-year mandatory minimum (largely due to confusion about the particular offense Travis pleaded to). The court of appeals clarified that the offense of conviction in fact had no mandatory minimum.

Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 104 (Justice Gableman);  case activity; companion decisions: 2012 WI 103; 2012 WI 69, 2012 WI 43

¶1   On May 8, 2012, I received a letter from Kevin P. Reak, counsel for Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., filed with the court, requesting that I recuse myself from participation in the captioned matter.  

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

§ 974.06 Motion – Serial Litigation Bar 

Issue (composed by on Point) 

Whether, following unsuccessful direct appeal, a motion raising a “non-constitutional” issue (propriety of DNA surcharge) operates as a “serial litigation” bar such that a subsequent § 974.06 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally barred.

Starks was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide sentenced to 55 years: 36 years’

Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 103 (Justice Ziegler);  case activity; companion decisions: 2012 WI 69, 2012 WI 43

Justice Ziegler, like Justice Roggensack and unlike Justice Crooks, recuses herself from a pending judicial complaint against Justice Prosser.

¶2   The highly unusual issue each justice is called upon to decide is whether he or she,

State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge 

The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)

¶47  To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,

State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect

Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived. 

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2012 WI 96, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”  

Martin was arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed at the scene of an otherwise unrelated incident (¶6, id. n. 6). Search of his car yielded a gun. When an officer asked him, Martin denied ownership. The officer then prepared to arrest Henry, Martin’s companion,

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity

Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.

¶3   We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  Thus,

State v. Jon Anthony Soto, 2012 WI 93, on certification; case activity

A guilty plea defendant has a statutory right under § 971.04(1)(g) to be present in court when the plea is accepted and judgment pronounced, but the right may be waived (as distinguished from forfeited), as it was here.

¶2   We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held,

State v. Abraham C. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, affirming summary order; case activity

Negrete’s motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty plea, on the ground that he wasn’t personally advised of deportation consequences, § 971.08(2), was denied by the circuit court without a hearing. The court upholds that result:

¶2   In support of his motion, Negrete stated in an affidavit that he “do[es] not recall”