On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

on review of unpublished decision; for Felix: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

Warrantless Nonconsensual Entry to Effectuate Arrest – Attenuation Doctrine

Issue (composed by On Point):

Whether Wisconsin should adopt the rule of New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) – post-arrest statements following illegal entry supported by probable cause but not exigent circumstances aren’t suppressible if made away from the home.

on certification; for Soto: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; prior post

Issues (composed by On Point):

Whether a defendant has a non-waivable right to be physically present at a §§ 971.04(1)(g) and 885.60.

If the right to physical presence at the plea proceeding can be waived or forfeited, whether a formal colloquy is nonetheless required before the defendant enters a plea via video conferencing.

on petition for review of published decision; case activity

Issues (provided by court):

Can a defendant be found guilty under the forfeiture statutes on the grounds of judicial estoppel where the defendant claims he made no statement to a prior court?

Did the undisputed facts on the record establish that if judicial estoppel had not been applied, the defendant neither owned nor controlled the barge that sunk in a navigable waterway in order to be liable under the forfeiture statutes for violations of Wis.

on petition for review of unpublished decision; for Stevens: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Issues (provided by court):

If a suspect in custody initiates communication with the police after previously invoking his Miranda right to consult with an attorney but has yet to again waive his Miranda rights, do the police violate the demands of Miranda by denying an attorney access to the suspect prior to the second waiver of his Miranda rights?

on petition for review of unpublished decision; for Thompson: J.P. La Chapelle; case activity

Issues (provided by court):

Whether the failure to inform Thompson of the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years of incarceration prior to trial violated Thompson’s constitutional due process rights.

Whether the complaint in this case was defective under Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) because it did not state the applicable mandatory minimum sentence,

Susan Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop’s Grove Condominium Association, Inc., 2011 WI 36, on certification; case activity

Standing – Generally

Lead opinion (3-Justice):

¶5   There is no single longstanding or uniform test to determine standing in the case law.  Courts have inconsistently used a variety of terminologies as tests for standing.  Therefore, as a prerequisite to answering the first question, we review the law of standing. 

State v. Omer Ninham, 2011 WI 33, affirming, 2009 WI App 64; for Ninham: Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Bryan Stevenson; amici: Byron C. Lichstein, Robert R. Henak, G. Michael Halfenger, et al.; case activity

Sentencing – Life without Parole for Juveniles – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Sentence of life without parole imposed on juvenile (Ninham was 14 when he committed the crime) upheld,

Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, on certification; for Jacob T.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

TPR – Grounds, § 48.415(6) – “Substantial Parental Relationship”

¶22  The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), specifically the underscored language, indicates that under § 48.415(6), a fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility. 

certification; for Soto: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity, circuit court affirmed 2012 WI 93

Plea Procedure – Personal Presence

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether Jon Soto’s statutory right to be physically present during a plea hearing was violated when the judge conducted the hearing through video teleconferencing and whether this issue was properly preserved.

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,