On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Omer Ninham, 2011 WI 33, affirming, 2009 WI App 64; for Ninham: Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Bryan Stevenson; amici: Byron C. Lichstein, Robert R. Henak, G. Michael Halfenger, et al.; case activity

Sentencing – Life without Parole for Juveniles – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Sentence of life without parole imposed on juvenile (Ninham was 14 when he committed the crime) upheld,

Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, on certification; for Jacob T.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

TPR – Grounds, § 48.415(6) – “Substantial Parental Relationship”

¶22  The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), specifically the underscored language, indicates that under § 48.415(6), a fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility. 

certification; for Soto: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity, circuit court affirmed 2012 WI 93

Plea Procedure – Personal Presence

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether Jon Soto’s statutory right to be physically present during a plea hearing was violated when the judge conducted the hearing through video teleconferencing and whether this issue was properly preserved.

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,

State v. Shantell T. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, affirming unpublished decision; for Harbor: Joseph E. Redding; case activity

Sentence Modification – New Factor

The “new factor” test for sentence modification has split into “two divergent lines of cases”: Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) (fact(s) highly relevant to, but not brought out at, 

State v. Marvin L. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, affirming 2010 WI App 42; for Beauchamp: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Confrontation – Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶34  We therefore, like every state court that has considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception. 

State v. Brad E. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, reversing 2010 WI App  11; for Forbush: Craig A. Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee; amicus: Colleen D. Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Forbush’s 6th amendment right to counsel had already attached – because a criminal complaint had been filed – and he had retained counsel before officers began interrogating him on that charge in the absence of his attorney.

State v. Alan Keith Burns, 2011 WI 22, affirming unpublished decision; for Burns: David R. Karpe; case activity

The court rejects Burns’s claim for a new trial in the interest of justice premised on three grounds: 1. Burns was unable to cross-examine the complainant on her implication that he took her virginity; 2. evidence of prior sexual assaults of the complainant by his father,

on petition for review of summary order; for Goss: Daniel J. Chapman; case activity

Issue (formulated by On Point:

Whether probable cause of intoxication to administer a preliminary breath test under § 343.303 was shown by the smell of alcohol on the driver along with four prior OWI convictions.

The catch: with 4 priors, Goss’s legal blood alcohol content limit would have been .02. Given that greatly reduced threshold,

on petition for review of unpublished order; for State Public Defender: Joseph N. Ehmann; for amicus (WACDL): Robert R. Henak; for amicus (Appellate Section, State Bar): Anne B. Kearney; case activity

Issues (formulated by On Point):

Whether counsel is entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard before the court of appeals imposes a monetary or other penalty for an alleged violation of rules of appellate procedure.

Whether the court of appeals’